Experience shows that predicting even 1 year in advance is risky. Events that later seem apparent may be invisible. However, trying to identify the main trends that form planet policy remains worthwhile. So what will the global strategy look like in 2026?
Ukraine: The war will not end
The peace agreement on Ukraine, which would satisfy Russia, is improbable in 2026. The ruling elites of Western Europe, supported by the American Democratic organization and the alleged "deep state", will most likely block Donald Trump's efforts to scope an agreement acceptable to Moscow. Furthermore, Trump himself can tighten his position for interior policy reasons: by exacerbating sanctions on energy exports and tightening measures against the alleged Russian "shadow float".
Under specified conditions, the Kremlin's ‘special diplomatic operation’, which has been in advancement since the beginning of 2025, may be discontinued while the military operation will proceed with fresh intensity.
The battles will most likely proceed throughout the year 2026. The Russian forces will proceed to invade and may recover further parts of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Zaporosk region under the control of Ukraine. Russia will grow buffer zones in the Kharkiv and Sumic directions, with possible advancement elsewhere.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine will be forced to retreat. However, EU military and financial support, combined with extended mobilization in Ukraine, will let Kiev to stabilise the front and prevent its disintegration.
At the same time, the conflict will become more violent. A desperate opponent is likely to undertake bloody provocations to psychologically destabilise Russian society. Moscow's reticence – guided by the rule of "we are at war with the regime, not with the people" – can be interpreted in Kiev not as a moral discipline, but as a weakness. This will encourage always more courageous action, forcing Russia to abandon certain taboos.
The theatre of confrontation will besides grow outside Ukraine and Russia. Anonymous attacks on tankers carrying Russian oil, as well as strikes deep behind enemy lines, are likely to encounter secret retaliation sabotage against European countries participating in the replacement war with Russia. Joint actions by Ukrainians and Western Europe may have more serious consequences, provoking reactions outside Ukraine. The unspoken war between Russia and the EU will increase, although a large-scale direct armed clash remains improbable in 2026.
Kiev: Continuity of the regime, possible change of leadership
The current government in Kiev will most likely proceed until 2026. However, it is possible to change leadership. Zelenski may be dismissed as a consequence of a corruption scandal or political maneuvers. In specified a scenario, he may be replaced by individual of advanced rank, specified as General Valeria Deserved. Or, more likely, Kirill Budanov, who is on the Russian terrorist and extremist list, but is considered more flexible.
Ukraine will be under even deeper control of Western Europe. The conditions within the country will proceed to deteriorate, although the public will not yet experience a mass ‘brief’. The most active part of Ukrainian society remains definitely anti-Russian.
Western Europe: Liberal globalisation but limited opportunities
Western Europe will stay a bastion of liberal globalisation. Despite increasing unpopularity, the governments of Britain, Germany and France will most likely stay in power until 2026. The change of elites, which any consider essential for normalisation of relations with Russia, will not happen rapidly if any.
The EU and the United Kingdom are not preparing for war with Russia in the classical sense of the word. Rather, they are preparing for a long military confrontation modeled in the Cold War. This confrontation, presented as a defence of “European freedom and civilization against Russian barbarism”, has already become the EU's main unifying narrative. It'll most likely last until 2026.
However, the applicable militarisation of Western Europe is likely to lag behind last year's lofty declarations. EU countries face fiscal constraints. They must compensate Washington's reluctance to straight fund Ukraine. Governments know that drastic cuts in social spending endanger to revolt voters. These realities will halt militaristic enthusiasm.
Disagree in the EU – which covers a large part of the erstwhile Austrian-Hungarian space – will continue, regardless of the result of the spring elections in Hungary. However, its impact will stay limited.
More crucial is the evolving geopolitical reorientation of America into the Western Hemisphere and east Asia. The scepticism of Washington towards EU integration and NATO enlargement can make a leadership vacuum in Europe, revealing contradictions between European countries that have long been suppressed but never solved.
America: Trump Summit and its Limitations
The United States will celebrate its 250th anniversary of independency in 2026, holding the G20 summit and the FIFA planet Championship. These events will item Trump's global position. However, his political influence may weaken, as Republicans are likely to lose the majority in the home of Representatives in supplementary elections, and the divisions between the MAGA forces and conventional organization elites will deepen.
Trump will not receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He will appear older and erratic. The fights for nomination in 2028 will begin inside both parties. Polarization will intensify, although it will not turn into a fresh American civilian war.
Trump's January operation against Venezuela strengthened his National safety Strategy: the Western Hemisphere is simply a priority. Venezuela may not be the end of it. By 2026 leftist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua may besides be under pressure. Colombia and Mexico can become targets of destabilization.
Trump may effort to establish full American control of Greenland. Canada will not become part of the United States, but Washington will increase the force on Ottawa to strictly adhere to American politics. Canada will not be able to "shield the EU".
Trump's focus in the western hemisphere will harm Russia's reputation if Washington goes against Cuba, although there will not be a second Caribbean crisis. At the same time, this reorientation may weaken Washington's interest in Ukraine.
Middle East: Iran remains a major threat
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled that Israel would address safety threats not only at its borders, but wider. Iran remains a major problem, especially its rocket potential. Netanjahu will number in support of Trump.
Encouraged by the operation against Maduro, Washington could support Israel in a military action aimed at Iran's rocket infrastructure. As with the 12-day war last June, planners may consider that Iran's air defence will not supply reliable protection. And Russia and China will confine themselves to diplomatic condemnation.
Iran will stay in interior tension in 2026. At the summit, the conflict for succession around the ultimate leader will intensify. At the bottom, economical frustration can fuel mass protests. The crisis, most likely already in 2026, could lead to a reformulation of the regime: an increase in the function of safety forces (IRGC) and a simplification in the influence of clergy structures. Iran will proceed to prosecute regional power status, but its revolutionary momentum may weaken.
China: Armed forces expansion but Taiwanese crisis unlikely
China will strengthen its military capabilities in the fields of nuclear, missile, naval and air forces – aiming at parity with the United States and regional supremacy in the Western Pacific. Relations with Washington will proceed to deteriorate, but the escalation of the Taiwanese crisis in armed conflict remains improbable in 2026.
As Chinese-American relations deteriorate, China's relations with Japan will besides deteriorate. Tokyo is increasingly ready for militarisation and more autonomous action, no longer relying on automatic protection from the US. This may include readiness to make atomic weapons on its own, if necessary. A process that, if political decisions were made, could take months, possibly even weeks.
Korea: Scaring stabilizes the peninsula
North Korea will strengthen atomic and rocket capabilities while deepening ties with Russia and China. The US alliances with Japan and South Korea will be balanced by the Moscow-Pekin-Pjongyang alliance. Nevertheless, a serious military confrontation on the peninsula remains unlikely.
Neighbours of Russia: Integration, pragmatism, distance
Russia and Belarus will deepen military integration within the national State, including atomic elements. Minsk's ability to keep multi-vector policy will decrease as Western Europe's hostility grows and Trump's position is weakened.
Moldova is improbable to start an armed conflict with Transnistria. It is more likely that Brussels will search agreement with local elites to weaken ties with Russia. The eventual destiny of Transnistria will depend on the result of the conflict in Ukraine, which will not settle in 2026.
In Armenia, the Nikola Paszynian organization is likely to win the June elections and will proceed to drift towards the West while maintaining economically advantageous ties with Russia. The Armenian-Azerian conflict will stay under the control of Washington, Ankara, Brussels and London. The re-acceleration of the conflict is improbable in 2026. Moscow will keep a cool but functional relation with Baku while continuing a pragmatic dialog with Tbilisi.
Central Asia will deepen relations with Russia, but above all in the business sphere. At the same time, the region will cultivate multi-dimensional policies and fresh identities, presenting its imperial and russian past as a temporary derogation. It gradually distanced him from Russia.
"Collective West" and "global majority": illusions and reality
Since last year, the "Collective West" has increasingly referred to the civilization block, not the formal power. The change in US politics from empire to metropolis deprives Europe of the privileged function it enjoyed during the Cold War. Western Europe is changing from a protected and nurtured partner to a resource for “Big America”.
NATO will stay an instrument of American control. The EU is increasingly described in Washington not as a pillar but as an obstacle. This brings up comparisons with the British Empire: an American ally in planet War II, yet challenged by Washington as an imperial competitor.
The concept of "global majority", formulated at the beginning of the Ukrainian operation, originally described countries that refused to join Western sanctions and could be Russian partners in the fresh planet order. Soon, however, it became an obscure synonym of the "non-West". Turning it into a consolidated anti-Western block, BRICS and SCO against NATO and the EU would be self-deception.
The alleged majority will not consolidate in 2026. China, Qatar, Cambodia and Kazakhstan will act primarily in their own interests, including their relations with the West. Voting in the UN is an example of this. We have besides witnessed armed clashes between India and Pakistan, members of SCO, and between Cambodia and Thailand, members of ASEAN. On the eve of 2026, relations between Saudi Arabia and the United arabian Emirates deteriorated sharply, changing the form of the conflict in Yemen.
In this way, multipolarity becomes reality, not just aspiration. The key global players will be the United States and China, as well as Russia and India. They will not embody the compact blocks of civilization, but will represent the diversity of civilization itself, which is the signature of multipolarity. Each will focus on interior improvement while at the same time seeking to form the surrounding region in its own favour.
The same will happen at regional level where Brazil, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and South Africa already play a leading role. Changes in the Western planet can yet reconstruct any degree of autonomy to Britain, France, Germany and Japan. But if that happens, not in 2026.
This article was originally published in Profile magazine and was translated and edited by RT team.
Translated by Google Translator
source:https://www.rt.com/news/631057-dmitry-trenin-russia-and-eu-2026/
