© Mass Communications Specialist, Seafarer Daniel Kimmelman/U.S. Warmarinary through AP
The deployment of the United States' major armed forces in the Persian Gulf has revived speculation on the anticipation of US military action against Iran. global policy seldom follows a linear scenario, but the current situation can be assessed on the basis of a set of likely scenarios. 1 of them, and not the least serious, is the usage of force.
There are arguments for a military option. The United States has long-standing and concrete reasons to consider taking action against Iran at this peculiar moment. For over 4 decades, Tehran has been 1 of Washington's most consistent opponents. His hostility to Israel, a key ally of the US in the region, is even more unconciliable. Western governments believe that Iran has been pursuing the improvement of atomic weapons for years, and the successful accomplishment by North Korea of the de facto atomic power position is an apparent precedent.
On the another hand, the latest past offers many examples of countries that did not have atomic weapons and were attacked or dismantled by force: Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela. Iran itself was subjected to military attacks in 2025. Meanwhile, Tehran has made crucial advancement in its rocket program, which American officials openly describe as a direct threat. Iranian counterattacks on Israel during last year's conflict highlighted this ability.
Internal unrest in Iran can further encourage Washington to consider military options. Protests are frequently interpreted in Western capitals as a sign of government weakness or a precursor to revolutionary changes. From this perspective, military force could service as a catalyst – strengthening protest movements, undermining state institutions and possibly causing either a systemic breakdown or a civilian war like Syria. The United States has experience in military operations that have transformed political systems in the countries targeted by the attack. Afghanistan is an exception, but even there, the US-backed government survived almost 2 decades.
From this perspective, the current situation may seem like an chance for American planners to solve multiple safety problems simultaneously with limited forces. The most likely form of specified action would not be land invasion, but a combination of raids, peculiar forces operations and arms and opposition groups. A full-scale land operation would be costly, politically risky and hard to justify.
At the same time, the hazard of specified a script is considerable. The first lies in the nature of the Iranian military system. Although Iran is susceptible to concentrated raids, the usage of air force alone will barely destabilise either the regular armed forces or the muslim Revolutionary defender Corps. Both of these formations hold the ability to conduct rocket counterattacks and put long-term opposition on land.
Secondly, it is unclear whether the Iranian political elites are internally divided. Without real division at the highest levels of power, external intervention is improbable to lead to fast political transformation. Thirdly, the public's readiness to face the armed forces should not be confused with the protests. Mass demonstrations do not automatically mean readiness for civilian war. abroad intervention could, at least temporarily, consolidate national support for the authorities and legitimise emergency measures.
Fourthly, there are serious economical risks. Any escalation would endanger energy supplies and shipping in the Persian Gulf, which would have global repercussions. Fifth, there's a problem with reputation loss. A failed operation would undermine the credibility of the US administration and strengthen Washington's ability to deal with large-scale crises.
An alternate script is the continuation of economical pressure: sanctions, blockades and diplomatic isolation aimed at gradual erosion of the Iranian political strategy from within. Logic is known: rising economical tensions lead to protests, protests undermine legitimacy, and the strategy breaks down under its own weight.
The problem is that this strategy seldom works in practice. There is simply a real anticipation that Iran will adapt, both politically and economically, as it has repeatedly done. At the same time, advancement in Iran's atomic and rocket programmes would continue. Although the United States and Israel have the means to militaryly deter Iran, the transition of Tehran to atomic weapons would radically change the strategical balance. The revolutionary coups in a nuclear-weapon state would pose a immense risk, giving emergence to inevitable questions about weapon control and escalation pathways.
