Editorially: American authors, Richard Breitman and Norman J.W. God, published a book in 2010 entitled “The Shadow of Hitler. Nazi war criminals, American intelligence and Cold War".
“ Freshly revealed papers of the American Army and the CIA contain many thousands of pages of information about their Nazi collaborators during and after planet War II, ” says the introduction. They are peculiarly rich in materials concerning the Covenanted with Ukrainian nationalist organizations after 1945".
These papers confirm what has been known for a long time – Ukrainian OUN-UPA criminals were taken over by Western intelligence after the war and thus avoided justice. Moreover, over time they became respected “democrats”. This book reveals the scale and scope of this cooperation, which is simply a shameful example of alleged double standards applied by the West. The book besides proves that the alleged communist propaganda in the Polish People's Republic of Poland in relation to UPA, which was not propaganda at all.
Below we callback a section of the book (Chapter V) devoted to unions Stepana Bandery (1909-1959) with Western interviews, including West German interviews. The material shows that there were serious differences between individual interviews between Bandera, the CIA was skeptical, and called for cooperation with another CNS factions, and MI6 and BND enthusiastic. Note – for applicable reasons we have resigned from placing very extended footnotes. The bulk of the material utilized by the author is in The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Here's the text:
"CIC (American military counterintelligence) was the first to become curious in Stepan Bandera in September 1945. The CIC interviewed UPA troops members who reached the U.S. business region in Germany, regarding the military situation in western Ukraine, the structure of UPA units, their contacts in the U.S. region and their relationships with Bandera itself.
In 1947 the influx of militants increased due to Operation Wisła, conducted by the Polish army to destruct UPA in south-eastern Poland, resulting in more information being available. Partisans said that most UPA militants were “ordinary” banders, but among them were besides members of the Slovak Hlinka Guard, Ukrainian SS-mani of the 14th Waffen SS Grenadiers Division (Galzien) and “conquered SS-mani German”. Most of the uppers recognized Bandera as their leader.
The russian refugees felt that they did not finish the fight by going to Germany, but alternatively regrouped to another, coming. 1 origin mentions that in September 1947 the banners recruited many members in stateless camps – their main verbund was Anton Eichner, a erstwhile SS officer. Another origin says that "UPA predicts the end of communism in the close future... the war will come... they expect... to fight either as a frontal strike group or, utilizing their erstwhile experience, as guerrillas behind Russian lines...".
By August 1947, the banners were represented in all Ukrainian stateless camp, both in the American as well as in the British and French business zones. They organized a sophisticated courier strategy reaching Ukraine itself. At that time, the CIC described Bandera as “exceptionally dangerous”. He was “standing on the road, frequently disguised”, surrounded by bodyguards ready to “get free of anyone who could prove dangerous to [Banders] or his party”. UPA militants said Bandera “looks like a spiritual leader and national hero of all Ukrainians....”
The Banderers portrayed themselves as leading the “hero Ukrainian opposition against Nazis and communists”, which they felt was portrayed in false light and maliciously by “the Moscow propaganda”. Bandera – they were never adequate to repeat it – was arrested by the Nazis and held in Sachsenhausen. Now he and his movement are fighting "not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole". Concerning the activities of the bandiers before and during the war, American intelligence workers seemed to realize small beyond Bandera's confusion with the execution of [Bronislav] Pieracki. They did not realize the function of banders in cultural cleansing done during the war.
CIC agents utilized UPA informants to detect russian spies operating in Ukrainian stateless camps who reached Germany with UPA troops. The Soviets penetrated UPA troops that paved their way west. Yuri Lopatynskaya went to the Ukrainian camp in Deggendorf in October 1947 to find russian agents. UPA members could besides carry out intelligence activities against the Soviets, as the UPA officers claimed they had experience in intelligence work against NKWD and Polish intelligence. NCIC's service pad says, "Don't you think this is simply a damn good chance to recruit any high-class informants?"
In November 1947, russian military authorities in Berlin insisted that UPA members residing in the US region should be transferred to them. "Almost everyone," said Colonel Igor Bancyrew (Head of the russian Repatriation Mission), "are russian citizens who participated in the war ... against allied nations alongside the German fascist army". The CIC officers recommended that we argue this request. Extradition of UPA supporters, said 1 of them, could “destroy the trust that has been laid in the US for years by all anti-bolshevik forces.”
The Soviets have determined that Bandera is in the U.S. region and demanded his arrest. A secret russian squad even entered the American region of June 1946 to kidnap Bandera. The strategical Services Unit (SSU), a post-war OSS successor, and a CIA predecessor, did not know about the russian commando. Nevertheless, it was feared that "serious effects on Soviet-American relations could happen with further open tolerance by Americans of Bandera's unfettered anti-Soviet activities on German soil". Since Bandera himself was not trustworthy, they would have gladly disposed of him.
Despite “wide-ranging searches” in mid-1947, covering regular weekly reports, CIC agents were incapable to find Bandera. There were fewer photographs of him. 1 CIC agent complained that Bandera agents in Germany “were instructed to spread false messages about Bandera’s description”. His agents besides misled the CIC as to his whereabouts. “Conscious of our desire to find Bandera,” says 1 report, “they deliberately effort to throw us in the incorrect direction” by giving us false leads.” CIC suspended the search. Zsolt Aradi, a writer of Hungarian origin, well-established in the Vatican and the main contact of the SSU there, warned that the transfer of Bandera to the Soviets could destruct good deals with the UHWR, whose leadership was then in the hands of the bandiers and with Ukrainian clergymen in the Vatican, like Buczko, who favored Bandera.
The CIA never considered making a deal with Bandera in exchange for intelligence work in Ukraine. “By nature,” says the CIA report, “[Bander] is simply a politically uncompromising man, of large individual ambition, who since April 1948 opposes all political organizations on emigration that advocate a typical form of Ukraine’s government in opposition to the thought of the OUN/Bandera government monoparty.” Worse, his agents in Germany were dishonest and insecure. Hearings of couriers from western Ukraine in 1948 proved that "thinking with categories of Stepan Bandera and his emigration supporters became grossly out of date in Ukraine". Bandera was besides a convicted bomber. The CIA besides received information about the fraticidal battles conducted by Bandera with another Ukrainian groups during the war and on emigration. In 1951, Bandera took a verbal anti-American position since the United States stopped supporting the thought of independent Ukraine." The CIA had its agent inside Bandery in 1951, mostly to keep an eye on him.
Unlike the CIA, however, British Intelligence (MI6) became curious in Bandera. MI6 first contacted Bandera in April 1948 via Gerhard von Mende. This cultural German from Riga served during the war in the Ostministery of Alfred Rosenberg, as head of the Caucasus section and Turkestan section, recruiting russian Muslims from central Asia to fight against the USSR. In this capacity, he was personally informed of the activities and capabilities of UPA. The British's first contacts with Bandera did not produce any results because, as the CIA later learned, the political, financial and method requirements [the Ukrainians] were greater than what the British were willing to accept. However, as of 1949 MI6 began helping Bandera by sending his agents to western Ukraine through airdrops. In 1950, MI6 began training these agents expecting them to carry out intelligence tasks in western Ukraine.
The CIA and State Department officials categorically opposed the usage of Bandera. Since 1950, the CIA has worked with Hryniocha-Lebeda Group and has begun sending its own agents to Western Ukraine to make contact with UHWR. The flag was no longer supported by the UHWR or even supported by the OUN leaders in Ukraine. Bandera agents acted deliberately against Ukrainian agents utilized by the CIA. In April 1951, CIA officials tried to convince MI6 to halt providing support for Bandera. MI6 refused. It was feared that Bandera could send agents without British support, which is why MI6 "tryed hard to find a way to take control of Bandera's transmission routes". The British besides felt that the CIA underestimated the importance of Bandera. "Bandra's name" – they said – "still means a lot in Ukraine and ... UPA looks forward primarily to its person".
In addition, MI6 argued that the Bandery group is "the strongest Ukrainian organization abroad and as specified is predestined to train organization staff, [and] build a morally and politically healthy organization...". British officials considered “the anticipation and request to engage in secret operations in the russian Union another than those of a purely intelligence nature”. But the CIA and State Department officials were “very powerfully opposed” to the London thought of utilizing Bandera in Ukraine. The flag, the Americans said, "lost contact with the general sentiments prevailing in Ukraine, especially in the old Polish territories, where... the russian government was highly successful in the work of transforming the head of the young generation." For the CIA, the best solution for intelligence in Ukraine was the "political neutralization of Bandera". The British argued that specified an action would ‘bring the origin of recruits dry’ and ‘stop British operations’. MI6 ignored the CIA message stating that "Bandera...is politically unacceptable to the American government".
British actions utilizing Bandera have expanded. At the beginning of 1954, MI6 noted that “the operational aspect of this [British] cooperation [with Bandera] developed satisfactorily. Gradually more complete control was obtained over infiltration operations and although the benefits of the interview were small, it was considered worth continuing these activities....’ According to his superiors, Bandera was “a professional underground individual with a terrorist past and with ruthless notions of the principles of the game going on... a bandit type, if you prefer, with a fiery patriotism that gives ethical background and justification to his banditism. Neither better nor worse than another of its kind...’.
UHWR rejected Bandera's authoritarian approach and demanded unity on emigration. In reports delivered from Ukraine by CIA agents UHWR insisted in the summertime of 1953 that Łebed represent "the full Ukrainian liberation movement in his homeland". American and British officials tried to reconcile Bandera with the thought of Łebed's leadership, but Bander and Stećko refused. In February 1954 London had had enough. "It looked like it," said Bandera's superiors, "that there is no alternate to breaking up with Bandera in order to defend the healthy elements remaining in the OCH/OUN and to proceed utilizing them operationally. The gap between us was final.” MI6 failed to train agents inactive faithful to Bandera. In July, MI6 informed Łebed that “he would not resume contact with Bandera regardless of circumstances”. MI6 maintained 4 radio links with Ukraine, now operated by the reconstructed ZCh/CNS and shared intelligence received through this way with Łebed and CIA. The degree to which the MI6 links were compromised due to the uncertainty of the Bandera line was not sufficiently exposed.
The flag remained in Munich. He had 2 British-trained radio operators and continued to recruit agents himself. He published a paper that empathized anti-American rhetoric and utilized loyal thugs to attack another Ukrainian emigration newspapers and terrorize political opponents. He attempted to infiltrate the American military and intelligence in Europe to intimidate Ukrainians working for the United States. He was inactive sending agents to Ukraine, backing them with false dollars. In 1957, the CIA and MI6 stated that all erstwhile Bandera agents in Ukraine were under russian control. The question was, what to do? American and British intelligence officials lamented that "against our unanimous desire 'to calm down' Bandera, precautions must be taken to prevent the Soviets from being kidnapped or killed ...no substance what the circumstances may be, we must not let Bandera to become a martyr."
Meanwhile, Bandera was looking for fresh sponsors. For a short time, early 1956, he was sponsored by Italian military intelligence (SIFAR), most likely not knowing that his contact lines were burned. BND, West German intelligence under the leadership of the erstwhile General Wehrmacht Reinhard Gehlen, He's made fresh contact with Bandera. It was a natural relationship. During the war, elder Gehlena officers argued that the USSR could have been defeated if only Germans had decently sought the consideration of his various nationalities. Bandera inactive owned contact paths with Ukraine and in March 1956 offered them to BND in exchange for money and weapons. The CIA warned Western Germans that it was “against any operational cooperation with Bandera” by noting – “we are convinced that all alleged assets of Bandera in the CSRS, Poland and Ukraine do not be or are ineffective. We besides announcement the violent and thoroughness of russian compilations [of] his erstwhile operations indicating a mediocre level of safety in the CNS/B."
The Bavarian government and the Munich national police wanted to carry out an action against Bandera's organization for a number of crimes—from forgery to kidnapping. However, Von Mende, now a West German government official, protected him. Bandera transmitted Von Mende political reports which he in turn transmitted to the West German Ministry of abroad Affairs. Von Mende, who had previously routinely intervened in the Bavarian government on the right to reside for Bandera and specified akin matters, intervened in the Bavarian authorities this time on ‘false passports and another documents’. The exact results of Von Mende's aid are unknown, it is adequate to state that the authorities left Bandera alone.
In April 1959, Bandera again addressed West German intelligence asking for support and this time Gehlen was interested. The CIA noted that "it is [is] apparent that Bandera is seeking support for illegal operations in Ukraine". The Western Germany agreed to support at least 1 specified mission, raising the fact that "Bandera and his group are no longer throat-cutters as they utilized to be" and due to the fact that Bandera "delivered evidence of functioning interior contact". The group trained and financed by the BND crossed the Czechoslovak border in July 1959, and the BND promised Bandera assistance in future operations of this kind if the current operation was even a average success".
Bandera's individual contact in a West German interview was Heinz Danko Herre, erstwhile Deputy Gehlena at Fremde Heere Ost, who worked with the Army Gen. Andrej Vlasov, composed of Russian emigrants and erstwhile prisoners of war, was now Gehlen's closest advisor. CIA personnel in Munich repeated their usual warnings. Herre couldn't aid but wonder. "Bandera," said Herre, has been known to us for about 20 years [!]... in Germany and beyond, has more than half a million followers." Herre reported to the CIA's Munich cell that he is aware of Bandera's earlier reputation, [but] he is besides aware that nothing happened during BND's [Bandera] collaboration, which would indicate that Bandera inactive applies his brutal tactics... [Herre] besides feels that in rule Bandera has more to offer operationally than most if not all Russian (sic!) immigration groups in the West.
Herre admitted that the usage of Bandera by West German intelligence was a “closely maintained” secret even inside the BND and that this relation was not full revealed to Bonn for political reasons.” In September, Herre reported that the BND had received "good reports [foreign intelligence] about russian Ukraine" as a consequence of these operations. He offered to keep the CIA informed of Bandera's actions in exchange for a favor. Bandera has been trying to get an American visa since 1955 to meet his Ukrainian supporters in the United States, as well as to meet individual from the State Department and the CIA. Herre thought that a visa received with West German aid would improve his own contacts with Bandera. CIA officials in Munich actually recommended granting Bandera a visa in October 1959.
But on October 15, 1959, only 10 days after the Munich CIA cell supported the visa request, the KGB killer, Bogdan Stashinskij He murdered Bandera with a peculiar weapon he sprayed cyanide on the victim's face. Soviets who have penetrated Bandera and BND for years have seemingly decided that they cannot tolerate another alliance of German intelligence officers with Ukrainian fanatics. Staszynskij received the Order of the Red Flag for his task.
American Consul General in Munich Edward Page noted that ‘Murders are nothing fresh in the Ukrainian nationalist movementIt’s okay. ” Although Bandera's death was demoralizing in the sense that the assassination was carried out under the nose of Bandera's bodyguards, Page noted that “many crucial emigration figures did not mourn his death“ This was especially actual of those who leaned toward democratic institutions and felt the flagrant, violent tactics of a strong hand. The Bandera faction continued to exist, but was completely penetrated by the KGB, even at the highest levels. Regardless, Herre kept in contact with her representatives in West Germany until 1961.
