The Ukrainian People's Republic was to be associated with the Republic of Poland not only with a close military alliance, but besides with strong economical ties.
Both countries were to form a customs union in which there would be free movement of goods, and Poland was to get many crucial concessions in Ukraine – among another things, for the extraction of iron ore in Karnawatka and Kołaczewskoje – 2 crucial iron ore mines in the vicinity of Krzywy Rog, and besides to have precedence in the operation of phosphorite deposits in Wańkowce in Podol. 3 black sea ports – Odessa, Mikołajów and Kherson – were to open for Polish ships. Poles besides expected appropriate concessions here. Cooperation in the field of transport was besides planned – in peculiar the construction of 3 fresh railway lines and the provision of Ukrainian infrastructure for Polish trains. It was besides intended to connect the Vistula Canals to the Dnieprem. Let us besides not forget that hundreds of thousands of Poles lived in the areas that were granted to Ukraine under the Warsaw Agreement of 21 April 1920, with Polish landowners and Polish merchants and entrepreneurs being its economical elite – especially in the area of east Volyn, Podola and the Kiev Land. However, the political task behind which the Ataman Semen Petlura stood and which Józef Piłsudski had been patronized for any time suffered defeat. It is worth trying to answer why.
The Warsaw Battle, besides known as the Miracle on the Vistula River, ended with a pogrom of russian troops, specifically their Western Front, headed by General Tuchaszewski. At the time erstwhile General Tuchachevsky's armies were killed in Mazowsz and in the northern part of Lublin, the 1st Budionny Horse Army stormed the Lviv unsuccessfully, ignoring calls to go to aid them. The time that Budionny mistreated at Lviv, Polish troops utilized to deal with Tuchaczewski. Finally, on August 20, 1920, Budionny resigned from his effort to conquer Lviv and moved north. However, he did not scope where he was to reach, for he decided on the way to capture Zamość, who attacked on 27 August 1920.
Thus he deviated with his army from the route, and he lost precious time again, especially as in the following days his troops could not break the opposition of the defenders of Zamość, which was defended, among others, by the divisions of the Ukrainian 6th firearm Division Gen. Marek Bezruczka. Meanwhile, after dealing with Tuchaczewski, Poles could take care of Budionny...
On August 31, 1920, under Komarov, the 1st Horse Army was attacked from the north by the Tuchaczewski 3rd Army divisions, and from the south – by the 6th Army divisions. Among the second were 2 driving divisions, with the main weight of the fight being the 1st Driving Division. As a result, a large cavalry conflict took place here. The conflict ended with the triumph of the Polish troops, which from that minute on the confederate side of the front besides went to a strong offensive, rapidly recovering the lost areas in June and July.
In the Belarusian direction, the Russians attempted to halt the offensive of Polish troops, which resulted in a German conflict between 20 and 26 September 1920. erstwhile again, the Bolsheviks received a dense beating, losing respective tens of thousands of dead, wounded, and captured soldiers. In this situation, heavy exterminated troops of the Western Front began a hasty retreat, giving our troops immense areas of land without a fight.
In specified circumstances, a truce agreement was concluded in Riga on 12 October 1920 and preliminary peace terms were established. In the next six days Polish troops were inactive moving a fewer twelve more – 1 100 and tens of kilometres, which included Minsk (taken on October 15), which unfortunately, as well as Minsk Kojdanowszewsza, where the Polish population was definitely dominant, had to be left in the following days.
On the Ukrainian direction on 20 September, our troops reached the Zbrucza line, on 21 September reached the Jampol – Ostrog – Krzemieniec line, and on 24 September – the Kamieniec Podolski line – Stara Uszyce n. Dniester – Zinków – Płoskirów line – Starokonstantynów line – Łabuń – Sarny line. By mid October 1920, the front line was moved east to the Derezhna – Zwiahel line. In accordance with the agreement signed on 12 October 1920, the territories which, in the light of the agreements with the Ukrainian People's Republic of Ukraine concluded in April 1920, were now to be transferred to the Ukrainian SRR. This meant leaving a large area – with Zwiehel, Płoskirow and Kamieniec Podolski, while Płoskirów and Kamieniec Podolski occupied our troops before signing a truce agreement.
Until mid-November, Poles were reluctant to leave the occupied Ukrainian lands, so as to aid Ukrainian troops proceed (alone already) fighting against Bolshevik troops...
It is worth knowing that at the same time as the Polish Army, counting 943 1000 soldiers (including 348,000 at the front), the Ukrainian People's Republic of Ukraine fought, counting 21,000 soldiers at the end of August 1920, half of them per linear unit, while the remainder – for spare formations and various rear services. In the following days and weeks, Ukrainian troops were rapidly strengthened, leading an intensive recruitment among the captured soldiers of the Bolshevik Ukrainian nationality, so that in November 1920 the Ukrainian military reached the state of 39 1000 people.
On the entry into force of the agreement concerning the conclusion of the truce and the establishment of the preliminary conditions of peace, which took place on 18 October 1920, the agreements concluded by Józef Piłsudski with the Ukrainian People's Republic attaman Semen Petlura were formally broken by the Polish side (although Poles continued to supply Petlura troops with weapons, ammunition, food and another articles, and they continued to usage the shield of Polish troops, which remained in Żytomierce and Podolu for respective weeks).
Many Polish commentators believe that Poland made a serious mistake at the time, due to the fact that in this way it turned its back on its Ukrainian ally, which wasted the chance to make a Polish-Ukrainian federation. any of them – more orientated – emphasize that Petlura had a tiny army during this period, but in the back of the Bolshevik front with the Red Army there were many Ataman formations at that time, focusing up to 100,000 people.
No 1 asks himself how Petlura had so fewer soldiers under his command. After all, the area, which in the spring of 1920 was under the administration of the URL, operating under the protection of the units of the Polish Army and partially Ukrainian, was inhabited by nearly 8 million people. The establishment of an army of 100,000 or much more should not have been seriously difficult.
Moreover, at the time of the offensive on Kiev on April 25, 1920, the Ukrainian army seemed to have any real mobilization capabilities. Zbigniew Karpus writes in the article “The Ukrainian Ally of Poland in the War of 1920”:
"During respective months of Polish-Ukrainian fights in Volyn and Podol, more than 2,000 prisoners were captured in Poland. In November 1919 they were grouped in the following POW camps: Chain – 610, Pikulice pod Przemyśl – 699 and Brest Lithuanian – 778. [...]
In early December 1919, Petlur, abandoned by his allies – troops of the Western-Ukrainian People's Republic (the Ukrainian Halicka Army) – passed Zbrucz with the remnants of his army and found himself on the Polish side. In the opinion of the Polish side the front passed and then more than 8 1000 Ukrainians were disarmed.”
In total, there were about 10 1000 prisoners or interned Ukrainian soldiers in Polish camps (not counting Ukrainians from Galicia, from the Ukrainian Halic Army, who were more than 13 1000 in Polish captivity). A small further Zbigniew Karpus adds:
"In order to strengthen their future ally, Polish military authorities allowed Ukrainians to recruit to their troops in camps where soldiers from the Russian corps of Gen. Mikołaj Bredowa stayed (it was interned in Poland in March 1920). The desire to join the Ukrainian army was expressed by a division of the Donsk Cossacks under the command of Esauła Frolov and the Cuban Cossacks with Captain Yuszewicz at the head.”
Also in March 1920, the partisan brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Alexander Udukenko, arrived in the areas occupied by Polish units, and which was shortly merged with the part of Podola 4 of the firearm Brigade, which was captured by Polish troops. That's how the 2nd firearm Division was formed. In Jarosław Gdański's article “The Cossacks, Russians and Ukrainians on the Polish side in the 1920 War”, we can read:
"Before signing the military agreement and convention, the Polish military authorities agreed to make Ukrainian units from soldiers in internment camps in Łańcuta and Dąbiu and in Kamieniec Podolski – Starokonstantinów – Proskurów. As early as 10 January 1920, the Ukrainian Army office appointed as commander to form close the Podolski Stone 4th Ataman O firearm Brigade. The forming was based on the 1st Staff Infantry Regiment, which was converted into independent battalions No. 10, 11 and 12 and the artillery battery.
In February and March 1920, Colonel Alexander Udwachenka formed the Lt. Its members included: 1. Moylowski pp, the independent Galician battalion, the remnants of the 4th Galician Brigade, the Donal cavalry regiment, the horse squad of Colonel J. Biekego, the horse regiment. W. Sinagyja, horse's soot of Cuban Cossacks sotn. Father Yushkewycz, artillery squadron and bomb company.
Both units were merged under the orders of MSWojsk. No. 119 of 20.03.1920 in the 2nd firearm Division, whose command was taken over by Colonel Udovchenko. 4. BS was now commanded by Colonel Pawło Szanceprint, and the Independent BS renamed 5. BS by Colonel Burkiwszky. The division besides included an artillery division, the 2nd Colonel's method Regiment. Khachenki and 2nd Cavalry Regiment of Esaulah Frolov, who passed to Ukrainian troops from the corps of Gen. Bredov. The division received equipment and weapons from the Polish 18th DP. At the same time, at the command of MSWojsk. The fabric of the cloth was launched in the Danubes, allowing until mid-April uniformly to dress the 2nd DS.
The division, after being formed in May 1920, had 358 officers and 1039 lieutenants and privates, 315 horses and 164 rolling stock, 48 ckm and 10 field divisions, although “to battle” 400 – 450 bayonets and 170 – 185 sabers and 2 five-gun artillery batteries. This was due to the fact that only 1 battalion was ready in each brigade, and 2 more were only in formation and training."
It is worth noting that the preserved state study shows that on 22 April 1920 the division was to have 338 officers and 1146 officers and Privates. According to Paweł Szanceprint, it was to have 317 officers, 1462 privates and to have 29 device guns and 10 cannons before the Kiev expedition began. I find it hard to tell what these differences are.
It should besides be added that as shortly as the division was conducting combat actions, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, or the erstwhile 42nd Donsk Cossacks Regiment, led by the colonel, was excluded from it. Mr. Frolov (formerly Cossack esaule, commander of the Donsk Cossacks, who, after being interned by the Poles in March 1920 by the Second Corps of Gen. Bredov, a associate of the Denikin Volunteer Army, swore to fight with his full regiment against the Bolsheviks under the banners of the URL until the "war situation" would not let him to return to his country), after which he was connected with the Bredov Gen. 2th Labinian Cossack Regiment. In this way a mixed cavalry brigade was created, commanded by General Nikolay W. Sklarov. But let's look again at Jarosław Gdańsk's article:
"Another Ukrainian units were formed by order of 8.02.1920. These were the 6th DS and 6th Reserve BS, remaining under the command of Colonel D.C., and then General Cholera Marek Bezruczko. According to the state at 15 May 1920, the division, consisting of 16th BS (46th and 47th battalions of gunners – commander of Lt. Col. Roman Suszko) and 17th BS (49th and 50th bs – Col. Voroniev), 6th Artillery Brigades (pk Alexeyev), 6th cavalry division (pkp. Janczewskij), bomb company and service numbered 239 officers, 2253 enlisted officers and ranks, and 9 civilians, of which 135 officers and 968 bayonets, and 280 swords, as well as 36 ckm and 4 cannons.”
So erstwhile the Kiev expedition began, Petlura had 12 1000 soldiers, and his troops were not ready to fight yet. As a result, 2 (skeletal) Ukrainian squadrons took part in the operation, which had a full of only 4,000 soldiers.
In May 1920, 5th Chersonian firearm Division was formed in the Łańcut camp, which reached the position of over 2.5 1000 soldiers in June 1920 (12 June 1920) with 2672 soldiers, including 105 officers).
On May 6, 1920 in the vicinity of Mohylów Podolski, Polish troops merged with the Bolshevik corps of Gen. Mikhail Omelianovich – Pawlenka, which has been operating in the rear of the forces. It consisted of 3 divisions:
1st Zaporoska Division (ataman Andrij Hulyj-Hulenko)
2nd Volynska Division (Gen. Alexander Zahorodzka)
4th Kiev Division (gen. Jurko Tiutiunnyk)
The individual condition of the corps commanded by Gen. Omelianovych – Pawlenka is 397 officers and 5,950 officers and privates, as well as 144 ckm and 14 field divisions. So it did not correspond to half of 1 Polish division...
In late April, preparations were made for mobilization. It was expected that the mobilisation of 1899 and 1900 years from only the areas belonging to the URL, which were in the hands of Polish troops before the Kiev expedition began, would bring up to 10,000 recruits. First of all, it was planned to carry out mobilization in the districts of Płoskirów, Nowa Uszyca and Kamieniec Podolski. In the end, no mobilization was carried out in any of these districts, limiting itself to a volunteer enlistment.
Mobilization was carried out in the districts of Jampol and Mohylow, liberated in the course of the Kiev operation. In the first one, about 2,000 recruits were mobilized, most of whom were assigned to the colonel's division. The feminins who in the meantime were renamed the 3rd firearm Division. In turn, the mobilization carried out in the territory of Mohylów Podolski gave about 4,000 recruits, who went to the division of the corps of Gen. Omelianowicz – Pawlenka. Jarosław Gdański states:
"As an example, we can usage the Ukrainian 1st Zaporosian DP, which was commanded by Gen. Chor. (i.e. Brig. Gen.) A. Hulyj-Hulenko, and then Gen. Chor. M. Basel. It consisted of 3 battalion brigades – 1st under the command of Colonel I. Dubowyj, 2nd Colonel I. Litinienko and 3rd Colonel I. Trotsky, 3rd Division 1st Artillery Brigade of Colonel S. Roszczenko, and a cavalry regiment of the “Black Zaporozhets” commanded by Colonel Petr Diachenka.
The division besides formed a two- battalion 1st reserve brigade, which was commanded by Colonel W. Osmolovskaya. The spare brigades, most frequently counting 1 battalion per infantry brigade, were besides territorial command. And although the formation of the division extended to the summertime of 1920 and it entered the fight late, it was 1 of the fewer Ukrainian units whose composition corresponded to the terms of the agreement.”
But in the area, which in the course of the Kiev expedition (but besides earlier) was in the hands of Polish troops, its bases had many Ataman formations, with a full of not little than 20,000 people. The Polish command, which their activity followed thanks to the listening of the Bolshevik troops' radio stations, had a advanced opinion of them, and was convinced that their activity was coordinated by Petlura's staff.
Many of these troops supported our troops during the Kiev expedition and later. This was the case, for example, in the course of operations on Podol, where the insurgent brigade of Ataman Volyncev (800 people) took hold even before our armies of Haisyn and Bracław arrived. In fact, attaman Łycho besides operated in Bracławszczyń, who, with his 200-man group, attacked the rear units of the Bolshevik troops. In turn, between Winnica, Lityń and Chmielnik there was a branch of Ataman Szepel, who, in the face of the offensive of the Polish troops at the head of 500 fighters, tried to control Winnica. These are just any of the examples, due to the fact that many akin branches were operating on Podol.
In the northern part of the Kiev Land, Julian Arsenowicz Mordalevicz actively started, who in late 1919 subjugated respective twelve Ataman troops, with a full of about 3,000 militants. Its base – an insurgent republic – included 20 towns. erstwhile it comes to the northern part of the Kiev Land, only the Ataman Ilko Timofeyevich Struk, who operated in the vicinity of Chernobyl, refused to comply with his orders. erstwhile the Polish Army arrived, Ataman Mordalevicz officially recognized the power of Petlura. He received 500 rifles and 4 device guns from the Polish staff.
But besides ataman Struk recognized the power of Petlura, but refused to subordinate his branch to the 6th firearm Division, which was commanded by Gen. Bezruczko. In his memoirs, Struk claimed that his division numbered 5,000 people, but this number is commonly contested – it is considered to be definitely inflated.
In late March 1920, a peasant uprising close the White Church broke out. It was headed by Ataman Kurowskia. The Insurgents seized the Tetyi, after which they broke up a division that was directed against them. Ataman Kurowskia organized a pee which functioned in the territory of 2 counties, and it survived to the arrival of Polish troops. The number of units of Ataman Kurowski is sometimes defined as up to 7 – 10,000 people. In the following weeks, he defended the occupied area, working closely with our troops.
When on 27 May 1920 1st Konna Army made the first (failed) effort to break Polish positions in the area south of Kiev, it was the unit of Ataman Kurowski that took the first strike. Semyon Budionnyj wrote about it in his memoirs:
‘The next day, clashes began with large groups of Ataman Kurowski. The 4th division under Alexandrovka, Piatyhors, and Nieadychą broke up the troops in a force of about 500 people. A fewer bandits were captured. During the proceeding they testified that in all districts before Polish positions specified branches operate. Polish command armed them with rifles, most of German production, as well as artillery. These troops were tasked to prevent the Horse Army from developing their forces and fighting to force the opponent to decision to defence, and then, having lost our troops, retreat to the positions of Polish troops.
The Kurowski band failed to full carry out their task. Under the impacts of our relationships, they either died or ran through the woods. The calculations made later show that in the fewer days prior to breaking the enemy's defense, the Horse Army defeated troops in full strength to 15,000 men.“
So why did Semen Petlura have only 21,000 soldiers under his command in late August 1920? Why was the mobilization to his army carried out only in 2 counties? And why, finally, did the troops listed before the minute of the Atamans, who had worked closely with the units of the Polish Army, obeying the orders of the Polish commanders, and who besides declared their support for Petlura, do not join the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic?
***
The majority of those who talk on this subject seem to see the Ukrainian People's Republic as a akin organism to the rebirth of the Polish State during the same period, with the process of building Ukrainian statehood being interrupted solely by invasions – on the 1 hand the Bolshevik troops, on the another hand the White Guardsmen of the Denikin Volunteer Army. On the another hand, these Ataman formations seem to look through the prism of the Polish Underground State, which is an integral part of the Home Army, trying to find an analogy. Nothing more wrong...
After the fall of 1918, German and Austrian troops withdrew Ukraine again plunged into full chaos; even worse than the 1 who carried it for most of 1917. In almost all major village, an Ataman, who had his armed forces, appeared, and this branch functioned in part as a same - defence unit, in part as a band of robberies.
It was just about protecting your own people and robbing strangers. The Atamans mostly did not follow any ideology, or had a alternatively free approach to it. The most crucial was power, which active wealth and prestige. any Atamans managed to force them to admit their superiority to another Atamans, making their position grow, although they usually fell just as quickly. Sometimes any atamans made alliances with another atamans that were more or little voluntary and more permanent.
The regulation of the Ukrainian People's Republic outside Kiev meant little, with Kiev taking over the Bolsheviks as early as February 1919. URL branches withdrew on Podole and Volyn, where different local atamani functioned, who either recognized the power of Petlura or not. Even if they recognized it, it was frequently purely formal and usually impermanent. Petlura was nothing more than 1 of the Atamans, with his position being much weaker than, for example, Nestor Machno, who besides had his ups and downs.
In Khersonszczyz, Mikołajowszczyz, and in part besides in the Odessa area, the star Ataman Grigoriev flashed, but in May 1919 he was beaten by Bolsheviks, with whom he had previously worked closely. Meanwhile, the Ataman alliance led by Ataman Zielona, Ataman Gonkzar – Burlak, Sokolovski brothers and Ataman Struk began to play a crucial role.
Apart from Galicia, where reality was diametrically different, but this is beyond our sphere of consideration, Ukrainian peasants were not curious in building a Ukrainian state. They didn't care much about that. Ms Kossak – Szczucka noted in her memoirs ("The Fire") that the peasants' speeches were "standing on strictly social-class ground", adding:
"You were expelled as masters, not as Poles. Polish service was not considered inferior to Russian service. No 1 was stalking her. [...] The general hatred of “gentlemen” was not only classy at the time, but alternatively state-specific alternatively than individuals. "The Lord," as long as he stood in his wealth and defended himself, was an enemy who was fought without mercy. However, the same ‘Lord’, at the minute erstwhile the beaten man stepped down and settled anywhere as a castaway, became indifferent, in the belief of the peasants harmless, and no 1 claimed it."
Kossak – Szczucka adds that Petlura and the agitators from Galicia tried to set a fire of hatred against a national background, but in fact they failed at the time – at least erstwhile it came to Polish-Ukrainian relations. Otherwise, it was with the Jews, which in a moment...
Viktor Antolevich Sawchenko in his book "Атаманщина", describing the Ukrainian reality after the Bolsheviks captured Kiev, notes that during this period the communist power was limited to large cities. They besides tried to control the front belt, as well as the terrain lanes along the railway lines and junction stations. In the province, however, there were atamans who had armed formations, any of which brought together respective 1000 people. They, too, were the only ones who enjoyed it as specified an authority among the agrarian population, who constantly collected it. At the same time, as Sawchenko clearly points out, the ongoing war became ethnic:
"The Jews supported russian power and the fresh local administration in Ukraine in 60 – 70% consisted of Jews (the local judaic youth had almost universal support and sympathy for Bolsheviks). For the average Ukrainian peasant, Jews were commissioners, communists, members of revolutionary committees, militants of pacification troops.”
Sawchenko besides notes that in the Kiev state Jews constituted about 12% of the full population (about 325 1000 people), but in the towns of Kiev – 40 – 50%. 30% of Jews lived in Kiev. But in the villages of Kiev, they constituted only 2 – 3% of the population.
Ukraine was so a full "militarized area" – almost everyone had a weapon and at any chance reached for it. The period of anarchy, on the another hand, led to the emergence of an unknown origin in Ukraine, namely hunger. As a result, the Ukrainian peasants began to yearn for the order that prevailed before the revolution, and the hatred of the Bolsheviks became mostly common in them.
In her memoirs, Zofia Kossak – Szczucka pointed out that after 2 years of anarchy it was possible to announcement “slow, low at first, but increasing desire for order and law in peasants”. As a result, the desire for the return of the land, "as the only known representatives of the order." Kossak – Szczucka adds:
"As long as disorderlessness allowed to plunder and enrich himself with the easy-to-use, your good, he was kind and desirable. But erstwhile the good of another's lacked, the easy benefits ended, and the disorder remained erstwhile no of them were certain of their lives and possessions—better, Aryan particles of their psyche raised rebellion against chaotic destruction, increasingly clearer voice demanding the restoration of order. And to this came Bolshevism, the logical creation of anarchy. Without farms and “burges” to plunder, he began to plunder peasants with ruthlessness. Horses, cows, supplies, crops were destroyed. opposition was punishable by death. So rapidly predatory, fierce, as the component of strong peasant hatred turned distant from its erstwhile object: the land to turn entirely against the Bolsheviks. There have been more and more incidents of peasants defending their “gentlemen”, of revolts and uprisings that the Bolsheviks rapidly and bloodyly suppressed. So seeing the inability to free themselves of her forces, the village began to sigh sincerely for any aid that would liberate her from the red yoke.”
So not only the landscaping, the castle nobles or the Polish townspeople, not only the alleged “mazurs”, i.e. peasants of Polish nationality, but besides the peasants of Ukrainian nationality looked for Polish troops like salvation. However, they were not peculiarly looking for Petlura, who became 1 of the perpetrators of this full mess. If they were willing to tolerate him or even support him, it was only due to the fact that there was a Polish army behind him, with whom atamans and their subordinates wanted to beat the Bolsheviks.
In turn, stories about how Ukrainians from Volyn, Podola and the Kiev Land could not agree with the resignation of Poland Galicia (in the Warsaw agreement of April 1920, concluded by representatives of Piłsudski and Petlura), between fairy tales should be inserted. Ukrainian peasants from Podola, Volyn and the Kiev Land felt no ties with Galicia peasants who were Greek-Catholic, while they were Orthodox, from which until then they were separated from the state border and they called them Austrians. Moreover, Ukrainian peasants, as has already been mentioned, were fundamentally indifferent erstwhile it comes to national and state affairs.
***
In order to realize what happened in 1919 – 1920 in Ukraine, it is essential to realize how the relations at the time were truly presented, which I first can present on the example of a peculiar territory – namely the Chehryn district, which was not an exception to the rule. This was the case in Ukraine.
We are talking about a territory located in the confederate part of the Kiev Land (today it is the confederate part of the Cherkaski Oblast). Chehryn is about 250 km distant from Kiev. Well, in 1918, in the large size of the village of Mielniki (nearly 8,000 inhabitants), located in the mediate of the large forest complex Chołodnyj Jar, which occupied a large part of the district, a branch of peasant self-defense was formed, headed by Vasily Stiepanowicz Czuchupak. In the fall of 1918, together with Ataman Spiridion Kocur, he established the region insurgent staff, who recognized the power of the Ukrainian Government.
At the time, the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic, in the face of the defeat of Germany and Austria and the evacuation of their troops, decided to take over Kiev, in which he ruled the Hetman Skelepadski from the surrender of the Germans. Ataman Czuchupak rushed to Kiev, where he became battalion commander (curnia) in the URL army. He then defended Kiev against the Bolsheviks, and was taken prisoner, from which he fled to his hometown – namely to Chołodny Jaru. Here he proclaimed the creation of a republic covering 5 localities located in dense forest.
On 13 May, the Ataman Uwagow arrived in Chołodny Jaru at the head of the Cossacks (800 sabers), which was part of the Ataman Grigoriev division and was tasked with winning Cherkasy. The Watch Tower Branch merged with the insurgents of Czuchupak (400 bayonets), and 2 days later the combined troops hit Cherkasy, where a local Bolshevik regiment passed to their side, so they managed to occupy the city. On May 25, troops of Czuchupak, Uwagowa and Ataman Lichariev, in full strength of about 2,000 people, attacked the town of Chehryn, which is the centre of the republic formed by Ataman Kocur.
Ataman Kocur initially served under the orders of Hetman Skelepadski, but erstwhile he wanted to destruct the Cossack troops, he rebelled against him. In October 1918, he organized a guerrilla branch that undertook a fight against Skelepadski and the Germans. On 28 November 1918, he took over temporarily Chehryn, while recognizing the power of the manager of the Ukrainian People's Republic – not for long, however.
In January 1919, at the head of his regiment (600 bayonets) again occupied Chehryn, from where he drove distant supporters of the URL Directorate. Chehryn has since become the centre of his republic (Chehrynian russian Republic), inhabited by about 40,000 people. Kocur considered himself a typical of the Bolsheviks in the area and shortly merged with their forces.
In March, Kocura Regiment, already as the 1st Chehryn russian Regiment, participated in the fighting of the Bolshevik troops against Zaporoski Corps attaman Volochov, and in April was directed to the western front, where he fought against the Petlura troops. In May the regiment abandoned positions under Wołoczyński and returned to their hometowns. Meanwhile, an uprising against the Bolsheviks broke out in Chehryn (11 May 1919), and Ataman Kocur joined the rebels.
In the following days Kocur had talks with Ataman Grigoriev, who had raised an open revolt against the Bolsheviks a fewer days earlier. With more than 20,000 people under his command, with quite a few weapons (including armored trains), he did not admit any power over himself at the time; on the contrary, he demanded from various local Atamans to comply with his orders. Kocur assured him that he would join him, but again changed the front and hit the rear of the Grigoriev division (let's add the title of explanation that in the following days the Grigoriev division was decimated by the Bolsheviks and Grigoriev ceased to play a crucial role).
In specified circumstances, the attacks of the Atamans of Czuchupak, Observant and Lichariev on Chehryn occurred. The Kocur defeated them, forcing them to retreat to Chołodny Jaru. The Republic under their regulation at that time included territories inhabited by about 30,000 people («Гайдамацкaяa республик Яр» – села Мельники, Медведовка, Плесканивка, Плесканивка, Тыньки, Тыньки, Тыньки, Тыньки, Боровица, Сагуновка, Сагуновка, Сагуновка, Нечаевка).
In June Kocur re-created the Chehrynian russian Republic, offering a "soy" to the Bolsheviks, who at that time were increasingly struggling against the Denikin Volunteer Army.
At the end of June Uwagow at the head of his Cossacks left Chołodnyj Jar to join Yuri Tiutiunnyk's squad, but was on his way under Rajgrod broken. The weakening of the forces of the Republic of Chołodny Jar decided to usage the Ataman Kocur, who attacked her, while on this expedition he received 10 device guns from the local Red Army command. Both abrasions had about 1,000 fighters, but Kocur had better weapons (he even had artillery). From a harsh defeat, Chuuchupak was rescued by a branch of Ataman Derkacz in the strength of 300 swords that came to his aid.
In the summertime of 1919, the Red Army was expelled from Kiev. Kocur, operating in the rear of the Russian “white” troops, headed the “Ukrainian Insurgency Division”, consisting of 4 regiments of “Free Cossacks” which had 4 guns and 23 device guns in stock. Fighting against Denikin's troops, Kocur subjected the neighboring Atamans – Ilchenka, Chweszczuk and Satana. In total, between September and December 1919 he had about 2.5 1000 people under his command.
Kocur fought with the Denikina Volunteer Army on the 1 hand, and with the "burge-nationalist Atamans on the other". But it shortly turned out that the Bolsheviks rejected Kocur's proposals for "soy". Then he got active with the machine.
It should be explained at this point that Nestor Machno, who was the leader of the Ukrainian anarchists, formed a republic (Free Territory), whose centre was in Hulaipol, Zaporozh, where he ruled with an iron hand. His power was periodically subjected to many atamans, so that in any periods it extended to crucial areas (mainly on the left-hand side of Ukraine).
Kocur's troops (2.5 1000 people) were so part of the Centraldnieprowska Machno Army Group (including the Atamans' błakitny, Kelebera and Skirdy troops), with a full of about 5,000 people. The Group's leader was Ataman Konstantin Błakitnyj. At that time, Kocur fought on the 1 hand with the Chechen division, which was part of Denikin's troops, and on the another hand – with Czuchupak. Let us add that in late December Błakitnyj had an argument with Machna and their paths split. He broke up with Kocur, too. In January 1920, Błakitnyj surrendered to the Bolsheviks, but in May he revolted against them, after which he headed the insurgent division, which in July reached the condition of about 8 – 10,000 people (with 150 device guns and 4 guns equipped).
And returning to Czuchupak, it was in the summertime of 1919, with 2,000 fighters under his command, he declared himself an ally of Petlura and fought against Denikin. However, erstwhile the Bolsheviks returned to Kiev, Czuchupak made contact with them, after which he subjected himself to them and as early as January 1920, he and them began to approach Cherkasy. However, as early as February, Czuchupak announced that his regiment was part of Petlura's army, undertaking a fight against the Red Army and Ataman Kocur. The title of the explanation – this was related to the closeness of Omelianovich's troops – Pawlenka, who stayed in Chołodny Jara for any time.
Gen. Omelianovich – Pawlenko during this period was the head of a corps of troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and in a situation where Petlura under force from the Bolshevik and white-guarded troops Denikina was forced to decision with part of his troops to the areas occupied by the Polish Army, he marched to the rear of the Russian troops, where he continued to fight, crossing within a fewer months with his population of more than 6,000 people a corps of about 2.5 1000 km. On 6 May 1920, in the vicinity of Mohylów Podolski he merged with the Polish troops and headed the fighting Ukrainian army (subordinated to Petlura).
So in February 1920, Czuchupak formally submitted to the chief Ataman of Khersonszczyzna and Yekatierinosławszczyzna – Andrij Hułyj – Hulence.
What happened to Kocur at the time? And erstwhile the Bolsheviks returned to Transnistria, he hoped that in designation of merit in the fight against the petlurists and the white-guarded Denikin, his past sins would be forgiven...
In February 1920 Kocur's troops disarmed the 3rd horse regiment from the Omelianovich-Pavlenka corps, which made it hailed as the enemy of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Army. Soon, however, Kocur ordered the captured petlurists to be released, after which he went against the “bolshevik devils”.
It was then that he tried to deal with him his erstwhile fierce enemy – Czuchupak, but Kocur rejected his proposals. He was discouraged by Atamani Ilchenko, Chweszczuk and Satan, who began plotting against him, wanting to work with Chuczupak behind his back and make a coup in Chehryn, which yet did not happen, due to the fact that on 30 March 1920 the Bolsheviks entered Chehryn and Kocur's squad was partially dispersed. A tiny division of Chehrs with Ataman Ilchenko joined the Chuuchupak branch.
According to various versions, Kocur was killed at that time, comparatively joined with a tiny division to Petlura's troops, or fought inactive any time in the ranks of machnovists.
In April 1920, the Bolsheviks conducted the pacification of Cholodny Jaru. Surrounded by Bolshevik troops, Chuczupak committed suicide on April 12, 1920.
When writing about events in Chehryna and Chołodny Jara, it is impossible not to mention the neighbouring Ataman republics...
To the north of Chołodny Jaru, towards Cherkas, was hosted by Ataman Mamaj (Jakov Afanasev Szchirina, from Chehryn district). It was hailed in May 1919 as an ataman by peasants from the area of White Jar, an extended and dense forest complex. Having gathered a force of about 500 – 600 people, he fought with white and red. In the spring and summertime of 1920, he went under the skin of the Bolsheviks, attacking ships with supplies, in peculiar with ammunition that Dnieprem headed for Kiev. It operated between Chehryn and Cherkas until September 1921, working closely with Ataman Żelezniak and Eagle.
In the forests of the mediate Jaru (also north of Chołodny Jaru), extending along Dniepr, the Mlewsk Republic was established, whose center was the village of Mlewo (3 1000 inhabitants). It operated between April and May 1919 and was headed by Ataman Kolomijc. But as early as June, she was drowned in blood by Bolshevik troops. In August, however, it was revived by Ataman Gołego (Trophym Ivanovich Babientko), who organized an anti-bolshevik uprising in Horodysch in May 1919. However, it was shortly eliminated by the Bolsheviks from Horodysz and at the head of 300 – 400 insurgents moved to the mediate Jar. In May 1920, the 6th Cavalry Division of the 1st Budionny Horse Army pacified the area, putting all suspects on the line for cooperation with Ataman Goly.
Similar Ataman republics functioned on the plain south and west of the Chehryn district, as well as on the left bank of Dniepr, where they mostly recognized Machna's sovereignty. Let us remember here, for example, ataman Keleberda, who operated in the territory of the Zolotonian state of Poltava, and this is due to the fact that in late 1919 he and Kocur's troops co-founded the Centraldnieprowska Machna Army Group, which was headed by Ataman Błakitnyj.
In April 1919, he organized a local uprising against Bolsheviks in his hometown. In the following months, he conducted guerrilla activity, leading a horse branch. As already mentioned, between October and December 1919 it was part of the Central dnieprowska Machna Military Group.
In the spring of 1920, the 250 – 300 fighters of the Keleberda branch carried out pogroms of Bolsheviks and Jews, sowing terrors in the area. In August 1920, Keleberda was murdered by a Cheka agent who snuck into the ranks of the branch.
But let's go back to what was going on in Chehryna and Chołodny Jara. In May 1920, a convention of the Atamans of the Chehryn territory was held in the village of Kwiatowo, where a fresh Ataman of the Cholodnoyar region was selected. It was Derkacz (Andrij Czernota). Ataman Ilchenko became a associate of the staff of the Cholodnojar Insurgency Brigade and Deputy Commander of the Insurgency Committee of the Cholodnojar.
In July 1920, respective twelve Atamans from all over confederate Kiev, who formed a number of cooperating Ataman republics, surrendered to the insurgent staff in Chołodny Jara. At that time, he besides established contact with Petlura's staff, which, however, was then far distant in Poland.
In August 1920 Chołodnyj Jar became the center of insurgent action, which already included not only confederate Kiev, but besides western Poltavia and northern Chersonish. The full number of insurgents in this area reached respective 1000 people. The insurgents managed, among another things, to master Chehryn and the fresh Chehryn Republic became Ilchenko. Let us add that in the operation of the mastery of Chehrynia took part a branch of Ataman Pilip Chmary from northern Khersonszczyzna (from the vicinity of Cwitne and Cybulowo). In the archives of the safety of the Kirovograd Oblast, a study of a check informant was found who infiltrated the branch of the Ataman Chmary ("История банды Хмары"). We read:
“The Chmary branch grew overnight. By the end of August, he had already reached 450 souls, armed with rifles, rifles, bombs, with 2 “maximums” on the lavers. The full band was called the “First Chernolese Regiment”. A division into companies has been introduced. A method soot was set up to destruct railway lines and anything of strategical importance. [...] 5 infantry companies were formed, led by Sylwestr Sidientko, and a horse's sot with 58 souls under Chmara. A soot of device guns functioned on horseback and was besides commanded by the Chmara.”
When it comes to this attack on Chehryn, a horse's sotnia took part on the side of the Ataman Chmary regiment, which returned the same day for the evening. On the another hand, the infantry stopped in the forest other the village of Juchimowo, where she was waiting for the horse to return. shortly six rounds of ammunition and 3 bombs arrived in the Ataman Chmary regiment from Cherkas.
It is worth mentioning that on September 10, 1920, insurgent troops in the strength of 2,000 bayonets and sabers with thirteen device guns and 2 guns captured Cherkasy. On 18 September, the Bolsheviks undertook an offensive against the insurgents in the Cherkasy – Chehryn – Chołodnyj Jar area, inflicting considerable losses on them, and they managed to capture Cherkasy and Chehryn among others.
Meanwhile, in Chersonians, the Chmary Regiment went to Kirowograd, in which the steppe division of Ataman Błakitny was present. Many local youth volunteers joined the regiment. erstwhile they joined forces with Błakitny, Chmara hit Cybulowo Station, where a bloody fight was fought, and a large section of the railway tracks was torn apart.
On September 22, the Chmary Regiment (300 bayonets, 300 sabers, respective device guns and 1 cannon) arrived at Medwedówka in Chołodny Jara, after which he operated in the Chehryn region on the following days (24–26 September). At that time, there were about 3,000 people under Chmary's command.
In the first days of October, the steppe division of Ataman Błakitny arrived in Chołodny Jaru. A gathering was held in Medwedówka, during which Błakitny was chosen as an ataman of the combined insurgent forces, with a full of 20 respective 1000 people. The plan of the operation was besides developed, with the aim of mastering Cherkas first and then Kiev. It was to be attended by 10,000 fighters.
The Bolsheviks succeeded in restoring control of Cherkas, but their location in this city was very difficult. It was blocked all the time by crucial insurgent forces (about 3,000 people with 20 device guns and 6 guns). On October 10, 1920, after a two-day siege, the steppe division of Ataman Błakitny, reinforced, among others, by the horse squad of Ataman Derkacz, as well as the insurgent battalions – Chołodnoyarski, Złodopolska and Pridnieprowski, entered Cherkas, mastering much of the city. At the same time, Ataman Nagornyj stormed Zolotoza and Ataman Chmara stormed into Chehryn.
On 12 October, the Bolsheviks undertook a major operation in the Cherkasy – Chehryn – Chołodnyj Jar area, which not only managed to regain full control of the mentioned cities, but besides captured the towns lying in the depths of Chołodnyj Jar, and besides caused the insurgents serious losses and partially dispersed them. 1 strike group of the Bolshevik troops headed for Kamionka and further – the monastery of St. Onufre, where part of the steppe division was defended (a 1000 fighters with 8 device guns and 2 guns), supported by the Chmary Regiment. The second strike group of Bolsheviks, taking Chehryn, went to Medwedovka, which she won. The 3rd group defeated a force which in force about 3,000 people fought for Cherkasy.
Ataman Bakitnyj, who managed to gather with him only 3 1000 people (including the army of Ataman Ilchenko, or alternatively what was left of it), left the area threatened and left for Yekatierinoff. However, the way of the march covered the way followed by the russian 1st Horse Army, resulting in a number of clashes in which the steppe division suffered further losses and its condition was only 1.5 1000 people. The Chmary Regiment besides fought dense battles throughout the day (14 October) with the advancing columns of the 1st Horse Army.
In November Błakitnyj dissolved the steppe division, dissolving its militants to their homes. In turn in November – December the Bolsheviks one more time pacified confederate Kiev, where the Atama troops were inactive operating. For the winter, the Atamans dissolved most of their troops, and they hid themselves with tiny groups in the woodland.
However, in March 1921, another peasant uprising broke out in the Chehryn district, leading by the well-known Atamani: Derkacz, Ilchenko, Chmara, Zawgorodnyj, Kibec... one more time Chołodnyj Jar became the center of the insurgent movement, which this time took over 3 districts – Cherkaski, Chehrynski and Aleksandrian. However, as early as June – July the belief in triumph began to break down and the uprising began to fade... In Chołodny Jara, the fight continued only the most implacable, among which were 2 brothers of Czuchupak, who fought against the Bolsheviks until August 1921.
To conclude, I would like to add that the events described here were accompanied by an incredible cruelty, which was committed by all the parties struggling here without exception. So the murders, the rapes, the lootings were an integral part of what was happening there...
***
In turn, let us decision to the northern part of Kiev Land and take care of Ilko Timofeyevich Struk, who came from the territory of Chernobyl...
Well, in November 1918, he appears to us as the commander of the insurgent unit, fighting the Hetman of Skelepadski in the northern part of the Kiev Land. He was then acting as a organization to the manager of the Ukrainian Republic. However, erstwhile the manager sent his typical to this area, in the individual of Ataman Mordalevich, Struk refused to comply with his orders. He was shortly arrested on charges of carrying out pogroms, robberies, and robberies, and not following orders. He ran distant and joined the Bolsheviks.
Organized by him in February 1919, the branch functioned as the 20th russian Regiment, but erstwhile it was sent to the front in the Borodianka area (against the petlurovists), it lasted there only a week, as already in early March Struk rebelled against the Bolsheviks. He shortly submitted to the Sokolovski brothers, with whom he participated in the operations of capturing Radomyśl and Owrucz. In the early days of April 1919, having captured Chernobyl, he declared himself commandant of the First Insurgency Army. He ordered mobilization and began creating civilian administration bundles on a territory controlled by his troops.
Earlier, in the beginning of the 3rd decade of March, he made contact with the Green Ataman. At that time, he had about 3,000 insurgents under his command, at the head of which he controlled the area of Tripola (40 km south of Kiev). shortly the insurgent activities expanded to the area of the Wasylk district, adjacent to the Tri-Polish district.
As with many another Atamans, the Green was initially associated with the manager of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The 1st Dnieprowska Insurgency Division was formed from the insurgent troops organized by him in the area south of Kiev, which was part of the corps commanded by Yevhen Konowalc. Soon, however, in the relation between Konowalce and Zielony began to spark and Konowalek tried to get free of Green, which he failed to do. Eventually, the Green 1 and his men were sent to Galicia, where they were to support the fighting Ukrainian Halick Army.
But Greenie and his army to Galicia never made it. They returned along the way, then arrived in Tripoli, from where Zielona came to the URL directorate demanding designation of russian power and stopping resisting the Red Army. Greenie threatened that otherwise the Tripoli Republic of Povstance and the 1st Dneprova Division of Povstance would take armed action against the URL.
In the face of refusing to comply with his demands, on January 21, 1919 he marched on Fasto, but 5 days later he was beaten by URL troops. He capitulated green, and his army laid down their weapons. However, already in the beginning of February there was a Cossack – peasant territory of Tripolskie, where it was decided not to recognise the power of the Directorate. In the wake of this, Zielona grabbed arms again, captured Obuchów and Tripole, and in the face of the retreat of the URL troops from Kiev (6 February 1919) won inactive Vasilków.
Upon arriving in Kiev on 8 February, he offered the Bolsheviks an alliance, with the condition that he was considered an independent ataman. The Bolsheviks initially adopted the conditions submitted to them, but as early as the end of February they "forgotten" this and directed their Commissioners to the regiments of the Green Division.
The conflict ended with the fact that Zielona openly appeared against the Bolsheviks – on 20 March a revolt broke out in the Tripolskie district, which resulted in the clearing of the district's territory from the Bolsheviks. Then he besides made contact with Ataman Struk and the Sokolovski brothers.
On March 25, the peasant uprising in Vasilkov and in the vasylkowski district, adjacent to the area under the control of Zielona. In the area of the White Church – Vasylków ataman Owsej Gonczar – Burłaka picked up 22 communes and gathered 7,000 insurgents under his command, while giving full support to Zielone.
The troops from the Tripolskie territory were from now on the 1st Kiev Insurgency Division (5 1000 bayonets and sabers, six divisions) and the branches from the Wasylkowska territory – 2nd Kiev Insurgency Division. The second was headed by Ataman Mark Szlachowoj. These 2 insurgent divisions formed the 1st Insurgent Corps (Kosz), headed by the Green Ataman.
On 28 March, the Bolsheviks captured the Vasylks, but already on 4 April the city was taken back by the Green troops. Following the blow, the insurgents captured Tarasza, White Church and Fastów. Having gathered 5,000 men (including 1.5 1000 horsemen) with 30 device guns and 4 guns, the Green Ataman moved to Kiev, whose garrison numbered about 8,000 soldiers, militias and checkers, having more than 70 device guns, 8 guns, respective armored trains and up to 10 river flotilla ships.
From the east to Kiev the Ataman Michno (not to be confused with Nestor Machno) was moving, leading 500 insurgents, and from the north the Sokolovski brothers and Struk led the attack.
The Sokolovski brothers, who were operating on the border between Kiev Land and Volyn, during the period discussed by us, erstwhile this happened in common with the Green Atamans and the Action Struk on Kiev, had about 1.5-2 1000 people under their command. They were equipped with 22 device guns and 2 guns.
They besides initially supported the URL Directorate, but already in early 1919 they became independent. They had their base in the Radomyslan district. Their “Radomyślanska Powstania Republika” included the area almost all over the county, along with its central centre – Radomyśl, it shrinked to the size of respective villages located deep down the forest. The situation in this respect was constantly changing.
At the turn of March and April 1919, the branch of Ataman Dmitri Sokolovski, acting as an insurgent brigade, managed temporarily to master respective localities in the territory of the Korostene County. At that time his father, Timofey Sokolovskaya, was at the head of the Insurgency Council of Northern Kiev, which was subject to 10 local Atamans.
Struk, although in his memoirs he portrayed himself as the commander-in-chief of the full force operating around Kiev, identifying them as a 35 thousandth army, in fact he commanded only his unit (in the strength of 2 – 3 1000 people). In order to strengthen the branch of the Green Struk, he sent him 500 well-armed fighters, whose structuralists welcomed the orchestra...
From 7 to 8 April 1919, the villages of look and Nowe Petrovce and Wyszogród were attacked by the Bolsheviks under Kiev (to the north of the city). The green female had already seen himself as the main ataman of Ukraine. He so sent a letter to Ataman Grigoriev, in which he called him to join him.
Grigoriev, who was inactive formally subject to the Bolsheviks at the time, but fundamentally enjoyed complete almost self-reliance, in his first letter assured that as shortly as he took Odessa, he would decision with them (i.e. with the Green 1 and his allies). However, in his next letter, he wrote:
"I have 23,000 bayonets, 52 guns, 12 armored trains, a million rounds of ammunition. I'm supported by Cherson, Santas, Odessa. Tell me what you have and who supports you? Nothing and nobody. If nothing and no one, I propose you join me to carry out the tasks which I will commission you.”
Meanwhile, the attack of the Green Ataman on Kiev broke down, or at least it seemed so. In a situation erstwhile the Bolsheviks directed all their forces to defy the attack from the south, Struk struck them from the north, which they seemingly did not expect. On the morning of April 10, the ostriches entered the city and almost completely managed to master it. But eventually, the Bolsheviks who threw their last retreats against the rafters managed to push them into the suburbs.
The opposition movement on the Kiev Land and Volyn revived in the face of the bolshevik military defeats suffered in the summertime of 1919. From the 20 communes of Zwiehelski region in 12 there were insurgent actions of local peasants. These actions were supported by Dmitri Sokołowski, who, on 8 July at the head of 3 1000 Cossacks, took over Zwiehel. The local Bolshevik garrison mostly switched to the insurgents' side (three 100 red-armists joined Sokołowski's brigade).
On August 6, 1919, Sokolovski, Kolesniczenko and Palientko troops again captured Novogród Wołyński (Zwiahel). In mid-August, Dmitri Sokołowski was killed, and his ceremony conduct was shelled from artillery, resulting in the insurgent brigade, which was later commanded by the 3rd brother Vasily Sokołowski, suffered considerable losses.
Vasily Sokolovskaya subjected his brigade to Petlura, which at that time you have taken on Kiev. A week later, however, Vasily Sokołowski was killed by a Bolshevik diversionist. His sister, known as Marusia, took command of the brigade, who left the area in the autumn, after which she fought first on the Podol and then at the side of Ataman Kurowski...
But let us return to what happened in Kiev in the last days of August 1919. erstwhile under force from the Belarusian troops of Denikin Bolsheviks began to retreat from the Kiev Land, the Ukrainians decided to usage it. On 30 August, troops of the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, supported by the Ukrainian Halick Army, as well as branches of the Ataman Green, occupied Kiev.
Soon there was a dispute over who was to regulation in the conquered city, to which Denikin’s troops had come. On 31 August, after a short fight, the Petlura troops left Kiev, which was occupied by the White Guards. Shortly thereafter, ataman Struk, then named the First Ukrainian Insurgency Army, came to town. They entered Kiev, holding the pogroms of Jews there.
But here on September 22, 1919, Struk agreed with the White Guards, subjugating his army to Denikin. Meanwhile, in October, the Bolsheviks attacked Kiev and the denikinists began to be pushed out of it into its suburbs. It was then that the rafters made the attack, which allowed to regain full control of the city. In mid-December, however, the Bolsheviks yet drove out the White Guardsmen and the Sketchers from Kiev. Struk with his subordinates withdrew through the White Church, Korswa and Jelizawietgrad towards the Black Sea.
On 15 January 1920, ataman Ilko Struk and his army arrived in Odessa, where besides (among others) troops of the Ukrainian Halic Army, which in June 1919 was driven out by Poles from Galicia, at the end of August together with troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and troops of the Ataman Zielione took part in Kiev's operation, which I wrote about before a minute ago, and in late November 1919 she surrendered to Denik. On 25 January, in connection with the evacuation of the White Guards, the Ukrainian Halick Army took control of Odessa, and Struk was now to defend its “western sector”.
But here in early February, the Ukrainian Halick Army surrendered to the Bolsheviks. The structure, which had countless murders on Bolsheviks and Jews, decided to flee Odessa. He and his army went over Dniestr and on the night of 29 February to 1 March moved to Romania. However, he returned to Ukraine after a day and a half. Struk wrote in his memoirs:
“During this march, my squad counted nearly 5,000 people. In this way we did not pass arms or wealth to Romanians, and yet we caused them much fear.”
Let us add that the number given here is called into question – as grossly overstated... On the night of March 5, 1920, the rafters captured the Limestone, and then moved towards Radomyśl, which they besides captured by releasing the insurgents held there from the Ataman Sokołowski branch – that is at least what Struk claims in their memories. They then moved towards Ivankov and thus returned to the territory of the Chernobyl district, to which 2 days before the large Night holidays the formations of the Polish Army entered.
Struk made contact with them and took part in the attack on Kiev. This brings us to the most interesting point. This is due to the fact that Struk claims that he then took part in the gathering of the Atamans, which was to take place in Korostoshev (half way between Radomyśl and Żytomierz). Interestingly, not only atamans from Kiev Land and Volyn were to participate in this council, but besides from Poltavszczyzna, which was inactive under the control of the Red Army.
This council was said to include the participation of Ataman Andrij Lewchenko, who was the head of an underground organization of about 5 1000 people and operating in the area of the state of Poltava. On May 30, 1920, Ataman Lewchenko, at the head of 150 insurgents, stormed into Kobielak, but was defeated by Bolsheviks. According to Viktor Sawchenko, Ataman Lewchenko then worked closely with Nestor Machno.
In the following months, at the head of the insurgents' ward, he managed to importantly clear the Kobielacki territory from Bolsheviks, and to a lesser degree – the Szymieńczucki and Chorolski districts. By August, his squad had grown to a state of about 700 people, and in October already numbered around 1,000 people (with 10 device guns and 1 gun). Lewchenko then tried to win Poltava, but this action failed.
In November, Lewchenko one more time tried to win Poltava – and again without success. After this action, his squad was dissolved, and he himself with a tiny branch switched to the right bank of Dnieper. He returned to Poltavia in mid-February 1921. Having gathered a force of about 500 people, he resumed insurgent activity (in May his unit counted 1,500 people).
Sawchenko adds that in the autumn of 1920, up to 30 tiny “petlurovski” units with a full population of about 7,000 people, equipped with 50 device guns and 4 guns, were operating in Poltava. Regardless, in the confederate part of Poltavszczyzna there were Machnovian troops, with a full of up to six 1000 people (with forty device guns and 4 guns).
But let us return to this gathering of the Atamans in Korostoshev, where the decision to make an anti-bolshevik front is called. As a result, Struk ordered mobilization in his controlled territory.
But here are 4 days after this council, ataman Struk received from Gen. Bezruczko, who is referred to as “the only typical of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the area” (let's remind that both the divisions of Gen. Omelianovich's corps – Pawlenka and the 3rd Division of Rifles Colonel Udovchenko stayed in Podol; from the units of the Active Army the URL only 6th Division of Rifles Gen. Bezruczko was located in Kiev), an order to halt mobilization and to go with their troops to Kiev. erstwhile Struk arrived close Kiev, he learned that he could not enter the city, while he was to gather his troops in the area of the station Żulany and the village of Kriukiwszczyna. He was then informed to hand over his men to the 6th firearm Division and 6th Backup Brigade, which sparked his violent opposition.
He did not follow the order, but, after learning that Petlura had to pass through the station with his staff, he decided to intervene with him. Petlura listened to what the sub-struk of Cossacks had to say to him, but I don't think there was much to it. After about a week, ataman Struk received direct orders from the command of the Polish 2nd Army to go to Kiev and take part in his defence. Ataman Ilko Struk wrote about it in his memoirs:
“I took an active part in the dense fighting over Kiev. I took positions from Chain Bridge to strategical Bridge. I left Kiev with my squad as the last.”
Struk then withdrew with his men to Ploskirow, where he fought dense battles with Polish troops, and suffered immense losses in people. In turn, he headed for Wołoczynsk, after which he crossed Zbrucz he was under Tarnopol. From Tarnopol he moved towards Dubna, where he and the Polish 18th Infantry Division fought fiercely against the Bolsheviks. Then the rafters came to fight hard in the area of m. Crzyże, after which, together with Polish troops, they withdrew towards Bug.
In the further retreat of Polish troops, the strukists no longer participated, due to the fact that they crossed the front and moved back towards the Chernobyl district, where – having fought along the way – they arrived in August 1920. Struk claims that he did so at the command of General Atman Semen Petlura, while inactive in Płoskirów he was to appoint him commander of Kiev Uprising District. Struk wrote about it in his diary:
‘W Płoskirów me and Ataman Shepel called to himself the Chief Ataman Semen Petlur and appointed me commander of the Kiev Insurgency District.”
But it was inactive a small while before the rafters crossed the front and set off on their way back to the Kiev Land. On the another hand, Struk writes about what happened erstwhile he arrived in the territory of Chernobyl:
‘W Steszczynie met with people from my branch who hid on the place during the withdrawal of Ukrainian-Polish troops. My squad was immediately completed with officers and boots, reaching 3,000 men.
With that kind of force, I took a hit on Chernobyl and as a consequence of fierce fighting I captured it. Thus began the general uprising according to the command given to me by the Chief Ataman Semen Petlura.
The uprising was attended by the inhabitants of the following districts: Chernobyl, Kiev, Radomyslan, Ovruck, Mozir and Kopelecki. These counties were completely cleared of Bolsheviks.”
It is worth recalling at this point that in the borderlands of Kiev and Volyn from the fall of 1919, a division of Ataman Mordalevicz, who had previously fought in the ranks of the Sokolovski brothers. However, before he became active with Sokolovski, from December 1918 he sought to form a framework of administration in the Radomyśl district, and after mastering the Kiev Land by the Bolsheviks (February 1919) withdrew with the URL troops to the west. In March 1919, however, he returned and joined the Sokolovski brothers' branch.
In October 1919, after the death of the Sokolovski brothers and their father, Timofey, Mordalevich was elected leader of the Insurgency Council of North Kiev. As has already been said, Mordalevicz managed to subdue respective twelve Ataman troops with a full of up to 3,000 militants. Its base – an insurgent republic – was located in Radomyslan region and included up to 20 towns.
According to Wiktor Sawchenko, upon the arrival of the Polish Army units, he recognized the power of Petlura's staff, for which he received a "gift" of 500 rifles and 4 device guns from the Polish army. Sawchenko adds that in November 1920, Julian Mordalevicz supported General Stanisław Bułak – Balachowicz in controlling Ukrainian Polesia. It should be borne in head that during this period he was not subject to Petlura.
Only at the beginning of 1921 was he appointed commandant of the 2nd Northern Insurgency Group, which was subject to a immense area of action, covering the area bounded from the east of Dnieprem, from the west – the Polish border, from the north – Pripecia, and from the south – the Cherkasy – Wąpiarka railway line (so it was subject to the current circuits – Kiev, Żytomierski and a crucial part of Cherkasy).
Let us add that in the summertime and autumn of 1920 strong insurgent troops besides operated in the area south and south-west of Kiev / north-west of Cherkas. In his memoirs, Semion Budionnyj writes that after the withdrawal of the 1st Horse Army from its actions against Poland in the following days, she fought many “bands”, with the first clashes already taking place during the march through east Volyn, as at the end of September her divisions fought respective skirmishes in the Berdyczów area. But peculiarly violent clashes with “bands” occurred erstwhile the 1st Horse Army arrived in the area of the White Church. Let us return the voice of the commander of the russian 1st Horse Army:
"On the night of October 3, we received reports that in the Volodarka area, where the 3rd brigade of the 4th cavalry division was centered, a group of respective 1000 men with device guns and even artillery batteries operate in the forest. On that day, the reconnaissance detected large bandits troops in the area east and south-east of the White Church. It was essential to suspend the march of the independent brigade and urge its commander, K. I. Stepowa – Spizarny, to clear the area from the band. On 4 October, the chief of the 11th Cavalry Division of F. M. Morozov reported that in the village of Jakówka banda Sajenko had assaulted soldiers of the Horse Army. On the morning of October 5 in the area of Sinian, our soldiers clashed with a gang of 40 men, and in the evening in the village of Łosatyń fought another large group.”
Budionnyj states that there was no day to prevent clashes with “bands”, noting that in organisational terms any “bands” were more like regular military formations – with device guns and guns, with infantry and cavalry. So the fight against them was not easy, especially since they were mostly commanded by erstwhile Tsar army officers with solid military experience.
As we already know, the 1st Horse Army then moved south to strengthen forces fighting against General Wrangle's troops, with many clashes with the steppe division of Ataman Błakitny and the regiment of Ataman Chmary, causing them severe losses.
***
This was the case with Ataman troops operating in the heart of Ukraine. It is worth going back to what I wrote a small earlier, namely:
"Why, then, in late August 1920, did Semen Petlura have only 21,000 soldiers under his command? Why was the mobilization to his army carried out only in 2 counties? And why, finally, the troops listed before the minute of the Atamans, who worked closely with the units of the Polish Army, following the orders of Polish commanders, and besides declared their support for Petlura, did not join the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic?"
It is hard to defy the impression that Petlura simply did not trust the Atamans, which is why it is hard to be surprised, given the experience of 1919. Apparently, he sought to limit their role, but he did not have a state apparatus (not only efficient, but any) that would be able to carry out the mobilization without their participation and take care of the rears of the fighting troops.
If Petlura had taken vigorous action at the turn of April and May 1920 to build an army, based in these his actions on the authority-joining local Ataman communities, in July he would have under his command a powerful army and, perhaps, would not gotta leave the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to which he was forced in June – July 1920.
But could he trust people who could be told much about, but surely not that they sinned with loyalty and willingness to sacrifice their individual goals and interests regarding the construction of the Ukrainian state, and who committed the most terrible crimes at all step?
Petlura tried to get Józef Piłsudski to proceed his offensive after taking Kiev, directing her blade to Poltsudski. But it would be a suicide. Piłsudski knew very well that on the northern section of the front there is simply a concentration of Bolshevik troops, which are preparing to undertake a general offensive to destruct Poland.
The Polish armies taking part in the Kiev expedition were so tasked with reaching the borders of the First Republic (before the first partition), capturing Kiev and capturing in the area of the bridgehead on the left bank of Dnieper.
This task was full carried out – Polish troops liberated the remaining Bolshevik troops of Volyn and Podol, as well as the northern and central parts of Kiev Land, captured Kiev and captured the foothold on the left bank of Dnieper, whose depth ranged from 15 to 20 km.
On the another hand, the task of the Ukrainian side was to form in the liberated area of the Ukrainian army, capable of further offensive action – on the left bank of Dnieper and towards the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian formations of the Polish Army were to be released as rapidly as possible to the north section of the front, where the general offensive of the Red Army was expected, as we were just talking about. Gen. Tadeusz Kutrzeba, then Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army (first major and then lieutenant colonel), explained the following:
"On the way to Ukraine, Poland could incorporate into the war region the large rags of the country and a large stock of people defending «her» and thus greater possible in the war. [...] During the Polish business under the cover of the Polish front, the Ukrainian army is formed, which then takes over the further defence of the Law Coast Ukraine, i.e. south of Pripeci. Polish troops loosed by the recently formed Ukrainian army will be regrouped into the Belarusian front for further action against the main russian forces. Until the end of the Kiev campaign, the Belarusian front remains in defence.”
And the plans were truly ambitious...
The active army of the Ukrainian People's Republic was to yet number 300,000 soldiers organized in 12 infantry divisions (combined into 4 corps). Each division was to enter:
– 3 infantry brigades, each brigade should have a staff company (sotnia) of 3 battalions (kurenie) of infantry – with 3 shooting companies (sotni) and a company (sotnia) of device guns
– the artillery brigade, which should have 4 artillery regiments, including 2 light artillery regiments (each consisting of 3 75 mm cannon batteries), a Haubic regiment (three 120 mm haubic batteries), a dense artillery regiment (with 105 mm cannon battery and 2 150 mm cannon batteries), and a horse's mountain artillery battery (with 75 mm cannons)
– cavalry regiment (consisting of 3 horse sots, 1 sot of device guns and mortars and a method sot) and 10 semi-sotns of horse scouts
The following posts were envisaged for the formations of 12 divisions and 4 commanders of the Active Army Corps of the Ukrainian People's Republic:
(a) in infantry subdivisions
officers | Petty Officers | boots | ||
mustard | non-muscle | |||
Infantry Division Staff | 18 | 11 | 9 | 58 |
Division staff watchdog | 6 | 0 | 249 | 29 |
3 brigades | 33 | 15 | 24 | 90 |
3 socies of staff shields
brigades | 18 | 0 | 747 | 87 |
9 Infantry Battalions | 306 | 99 | 8 910 | 2 247 |
9 Battalion device guns sots | 45 | 0 | 1.269 | 261 |
Divisional rolling stock with semi-solar shield | 8 | 3 | 125 | 485 |
Together in the division | 434 | 118 | 11333 | 3857 |
Total in 12 divisions | 5208 | 1416 | 135996 | 46284 |
Corps Command | 32 | 60 | 171 | 325 |
Total in 4 Corps Commands | 128 | 240 | 684 | 1300 |
A full of 12 divisions / 4 bodies | 5336 | 1656 | 136680 | 47584 |
So in each infantry division, 15,742 people were to be counted. A full of 188,904 soldiers were to service in the infantry sub-units of these 12 divisions. That's what the Corps Command should be included in. The infantry units were to have the following equipment:
– 3.068 horses and 54.264 train horses
– 17.716 cars and 680 cars
– 1.920 device guns
– 121.344 rifles, 62.920 rifles and 8.192 guns
– 720 mortars and 1440 grenade launchers
And of course, there was all the essential equipment, all of which were listed in the tables for the individual divisions.
(b) in artillery subdivisions
officers | Petty Officers | boots | ||
mustard | rolling stock | |||
Artillery Brigade Staff | 3 | 1 | 5 | 22 |
Technical Branch | 1 | 0 | 97 | 2 |
Telephone | 1 | 0 | 256 | 62 |
4 artillery regiments | 16 | 8 | 40 | 168 |
6 cannon batteries 75 mm | 30 | 0 | 512 | 252 |
3 Haubic batteries 120 mm | 15 | 0 | 261 | 126 |
1 cannon battery 105 mm | 5 | 0 | 99 | 54 |
2 cannon batteries 150 mm | 10 | 0 | 198 | 108 |
1 horse Mountain Battery | 5 | 0 | 95 | 55 |
Together in the brigade | 86 | 9 | 1573 | 1359 |
Total in 12 brigades | 1032 | 68 | 19040 | 16201 |
When it comes to the request for the 12 divisional artillery brigades, it was as follows:
– 288 light cannons 75 mm
– 144 haubice 120 mm
– 48 105 mm cannons
– 96 150 mm cannons
– 48 mountain divisions 75 mm
An anti-aircraft artillery unit with 10 guns of gossip should besides be attached to each division. (a full of 120 anti-aircraft guns were provided for 12 infantry divisions).
Nevertheless, at the level of each body, 2 four-part 200 mm batteries (equipped with tractors). In total, 8 of these batteries had 8,500 people.
(c) in cavalry subdivisions
officers and officers | boots | ||
mustard | non-muscle | ||
Staff of the horse regiment | 15 | 25 | 54 |
3 horse dungs | 15 | 423 | 90 |
Horsepower soot device guns and maybe. | 5 | 117 | 33 |
Horse-technical sotnia | 4 | 143 | 51 |
Together in the horse regiment | 39 | 708 | 228 |
Ten semisocks of horse scouts | 30 | 720 | 40 |
Together in 1 division | 69 | 1428 | 268 |
Total in 12 divisions | 828 | 17336 | 3216 |
Additionally, there were sub-units of combat safety and service (including communication division, armored car division, car column, communications companies, method companies, engineering and bomb division, etc.). In each division they should number in total:
– 253 officers and officers
– 12 law firms
– 7062 Cossacks
The air force of the Ukrainian People's Republic, in accordance with the agreement concluded and the needs resulting from the formation of the 300 thousandth army, was to consist of 24 squadrons (ten aircraft per squadron):
– 7 squadron fighter squadrons
– 5 squadron reconnaissance squadrons
– 2 corpusive fighter squadrons
– 2 corpusive reconnaissance squadrons
– 2 corpusive reflection squadrons
– 2 squadrons of dense bombers
– 4 squadrons of light bombers
In total, the air troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic were to have 600 aircraft, 240 of them in linear squadrons and 360 in spare units.
And let's add spare and school units, phase formations, and any another squads and rear services...
***
Unfortunately, until the Red Army took counteroffensive action attaman Petlura did not take action resulting in the build-up of an crucial army, and only in the face of the retreat of Polish-Ukrainian troops from Podola it changed its attitude towards Ataman troops.
As we remember, before leaving Ploskirov, he called to himself the Atamans of Struk and Szepel, recommending them to organize guerrilla activities in the rear of the Bolshevik troops. Soon, through emissaries, he made contact with various Ataman groups, in peculiar with the insurgent command at Chołodny Jara, headed by Ataman Derkacz, and to whom various Ataman troops of a full of respective 1000 people were subject, as well as with the Błakitny Ataman, who commanded a steppe division of 8 – 10 1000 people, and with the Ataman Zabolotny, commanding the “Naddniestrański Division” (approximately 4,000 people).
When in the 3rd decade of September 1920 Ukrainian units in cooperation with the units of the Polish Army after crossing Zbrucz were again on the URL, Petlura announced the mobilisation. In the study of the WP liaison officer at the command of Ukrainian troops of September 26, 1920, we can read:
"In contrast to the ways practiced by the Ukrainians in the last offensive under Kiev, the mobilisation of this time is to take place immediately and the military is to be powered by all insurgent parts which are to turn into regular troops. Ataman looks forward to only the Polish equipment and weapons promised by the Army to be able to arm 40,000 immediately, to be mobilized.”
The study besides mentions that the peasants are in favour of mobilization, due to the fact that they no longer want to see Bolsheviks on their land, and besides that the Ukrainian military, marching, spreads mobilization posters that “generally do not make a bad impression on the peasants.”
Clearly, then, the lessons have been learned from the failures of the past, but it was far besides late. If Petlura had taken all the measures with all the energy in the summertime – in the autumn of 1920, i.e. intensive military expansion, cooperation with the Atamans, he would have initiated in April – May of that year, if he had besides made contact with Nestor Machno, who fought a bloody war against the Bolsheviks, and who in September 1920 had about 35,000 people under his command, there would be a good chance that this would have been successful.
Still, it seemed that not all was lost. At the time, the Chief Command of the Polish Armed Forces was determined to lead the offensive until it merged with General Wrangla's fighting troops in southeastern Ukraine – in order to let him to take action towards Donbas and Kubania, where he could make additions. At the same time, he would recruit Petlur's army in occupied Ukrainian areas.
Soon, however, intelligence began to flow to the ultimate Command of the Polish Armed Forces, which indicated that Wrangel might not last until the Polish troops appeared in its neighbourhood. In the meantime, the Bolsheviks recognized the liquidation of the gen. Wrangle for their precedence and began to prepare for a general proceeding with him.
At this point, it should be mentioned that already on 21 September 1921 the South Front was established, whose commander was appointed General Mikhail Frunze. It initially included 3 armies: the 6th Army, the 13th Army and the 2nd Horse Army. Let us add that even before receiving a nomination as Front Commander, General Frunze accepted in the Kremlin Lenin, who recommended him to remove General Wrangla's army before winter came.
On 24 September, General Frunze received a directive on the liquidation of General Wrangle's army, which states that "the 1st Army of Horses will be transferred to the Front." So then it was decided to retreat the 1st Horse Army from its actions against Poland and to send it to fight Wrangla troops (I will remind you that 1st Horse Army was withdrawn from the front of the Polish-bolshevik War on 26 September, after which it was directed towards the rear where it was to receive additions and then to be directed against Wrangla).
In addition, the confederate Front is besides named for strengthening: 5 shooting divisions, 2 cavalry divisions and 4 brigades, and besides subdivisions of artillery and armored vehicles, as well as a number of rear formations. These forces had a full of 68,000 bayonets and 12,000 swords, but the 1st Horse Army.
For now, however, the initiative inactive belonged to Wrangla. On September 28, his troops captured Volnowacha, and the next day Mariupol. During this time, the forces of the South Front counted 38.400 bayonets and 7.080 sabers, with 288 guns and 1067 device guns, while the Wrangla troops – 28.400 bayonets and 15.500 sabers, as well as 267 guns and 1377 device guns.
Every day, however, the advantage of the Bolsheviks grew. On October 3, Wrangla troops captured Sinielnikovo station, but their successes in this direction ended. The front stabilised on the Mariupol – Volnowacha – Sinielnikowo line.
In the study of the Chief Command of the Red Army, submitted to Lenin, the process of strengthening the forces of the South Front was presented. It says that the units that are on their way to the front or that have just arrived there number 26,000 people in the infantry and 5,500 people in the cavalry – directed as a complement to the 2nd Horse Army. Additionally, about 20,000 infantry soldiers and 4.750 men for the horsemen were assigned there. In total, more than 22 1000 bayonets and 2 1000 sabers were launched to the front of the 7th Cavalry Division, the 2nd Donsk Division and the 9th firearm Division from the Caucasian Front, the 13th firearm Division from the 7th Army and the Siberian Volunteer Brigade from Omsk. These troops should have centered themselves on the front – as recorded in that study – until 7 – 10 October. From Siberia was besides rushed to decision the 30th firearm Division, and from the Turkestan Front – the global Cavalry Brigade.
On October 2, 1920, Nestor Machno's representatives signed a ceasefire in Starobielsk with Bolsheviks, at the same time committing to take up a joint fight against Wrangl. And it's worth knowing that Machno was in charge of more forces than Petlura had at his disposal. According to Belash, chief of staff of the Makhnovs, on 23 September 1920 in the ranks of a compact army ("в одном кулаке кулаке"), under the direct command of Nestor Machno, 20,000 fighters served. Another 15,000 fighters counted the Makhnovian troops and groups, spread across vast areas of Yekatierinovszczyzna, Poltawszczyzna, Chernichowszczyzna and even Donbas. In total, Machno ordered at that time a military of 35,000 fighters.
Not adequate on this – at the call of Machna on his side there were Ataman troops, which have so far interacted with Wrangle, in a full force of about 3,000 people. On the another hand, it appears that any of the Atamans, who had been subject to Machna, raised a rebellion against him in the news of the truce. any of them, knowing what the consequences of Machna's "screaming" might be, yet accepted this state of affairs, but about 4,000 militants persisted, going to the Vorone province.
Eventually, the army of Nestor Machno, at the time he took action against Wrangl, included 3 divisions (groups) – each of 3 infantry regiments and 2 cavalry regiments (3 1000 bayonets, 1,000 sabers and 100 device guns). The 4th division was in the process of forming and at that point it counted 2,000 bayonets. In addition, there were: a regiment of device guns (500 device guns on tangles, 500 sabers), an artillery squadron (three batteries – 12 guns) and a black sot (200 sabels), and an additional battalion of telegraphic communications, a field infirmary and any another essential rear service. We don't take into account atamanian troops, subordinate to the Machna, who did not participate in the fighting against Wrangl...
This meant, nothing less, that the days of the army gen. Wrangler was already numbered...
It should be stressed that the Polish radio reconnaissance conducted systematic listening to Bolshevik radio stations, not only the Western and South-West Fronts and their subordinate unions and troops, but besides the Chief Command of the Red Army and the Southern, Caucasian and Turkish Fronts. Thanks to the breach of the code utilized in the Red Army, WP staff had a good knowing of its location and intentions.
Realizing that Wrangel was in a tragic position, the ultimate HR Command realized that continuing the offensive would be at large hazard and could lead to disaster. Poland, with almost a million soldiers under arms, practically exhausted its mobilization capabilities. The continuation of the offensive in areas inhabited by the Ukrainian population would, however, gotta entail a crucial reinforcement of phase formations and of various rear services, with no hope of gaining any additional recruit in the recently occupied areas. This would inevitably lead to a weakening of the combat possible of our troops, which, in the event of the Bolsheviks taking up a counteroffensive (after dealing with Wrangle) would exposure the attacking formations of the Polish army to large danger. In turn, the experience of cooperation with Petlura was not very optimistic, while the volt made by the machnows was announcing additional problems with Ukrainians.
In specified circumstances, on 12 October 1920, Poland concluded a ceasefire agreement in Riga with the Bolsheviks, as mentioned in the first batch of this text.
Gen. Wrangel, meanwhile, attempted to execute a preemptive impact – this time on the right bank of the Dnieper, so in the other direction, than he had done before. But nothing could save him. In 2 large battles, fought between 11 and 17 October and 28 October – 3 November, his troops were defeated. Their remnants managed to take refuge in Crimea, which shortly hit Bolshevik and Machnovsky troops to yet close the subject.
Poles did not halt supporting Petlura's troops and Russian formations, which were created under the aegis of Sawinkov and Bułak-Bałachowicz. Unfortunately, these formations were actually inactive in their infancy.
In order to give Petlura, Bułak – Balachowicz and Sawinkow time to supplement their troops, contrary to the arrangements made in Riga, no units of the Polish Army were withdrawn from the areas from which, according to these arrangements, they were to be withdrawn, and which were to constitute the starting basis for the attack, to be carried out (already on their own) by Ukrainian and White-Russian formations – this applies to the full belt from Bade to the border with Romania. For example, between the Ukrainian troops that were located on Podol, 8 Polish battalions were deployed to cover their mobilization and then their concentration.
In total, we can compare the conduct of Poland concerning the above mentioned formations to what was done in the issue of advanced Silesia and Vilnius, where Polish political and military factors allegedly had nothing to do with the actions of Żeligowski, whether it was the POW Górny Śląsk, cutting off from any military actions undertaken by Ślązaks or Wilniuks – and we know that in reality it looked completely different.
The same was actual here, where the russian side was assured that "we cannot take work for the troops of Petlura and Balachovich" – as we can read the letter of November 13, 1920, which was a consequence to the russian protest note – as these troops were outside the area, which, according to the Rysk arrangements, was to be filled by the Polish Army. And that in the same area where the troops of Petlura and Bulak – Balachowicz were located, until they took offensive action there were Polish troops? That they were clearly reluctant to leave, for example, the Słutsk district, where should they retreat in accordance with the arrangements made, and where were the Belarusian troops now formed? It could not have been otherwise, because, as the Bolsheviks were translated, the deadline for their withdrawal was not agreed:
"It is so clear that the march of Polish troops from the south of Nienowy could not begin due to the fact that the date of this march by both sides had not yet been fixed."
Meanwhile, conducted in the second half of October 1920 in western counties The sub-section of 10 vintages brought the URL army 13,000 recruits. As a result, and as a consequence of the recruitment carried out among Ukrainians who served in the Red Army, and who got into Polish captivity, the number of the URL army increased from 21,000 to 39,000 people in the period until November 1920. Petlura besides submitted to the 3rd Russian Army Gen. The ringing in strength of about 8,500 soldiers, as well as the division of the Cossack esaul Yakovlev in strength of 3,000 people.
The attack was planned to be carried out over 130 km. The Bolshevik forces who had against each another were made up of 4 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions, which formed the body of the Red Cossack of Primakov, as well as the brigade of the Ataman Kotowski cavalry – a full of 30-33,000 bayonets and sabres (compared to about 23,000 bayonets and sage of petluvian troops). The peculiar combat value was the Bolshevik cavalry (about 7,000 sabers).
But there is 1 more thing worth paying attention to. These were Petlura's troops in October – November 1920, operating exclusively on Podol. The mobilization was besides carried out there. What about East Volyn? The brigade (Крестьянская бригада), headed by Gen. Ivan Łochwickij, known as Ataman Iskra, was formed there. The brigade included 3 regiments of infantry and a horse sot:
Киевский пехотный полк
Новоград-Владимиро-Волынский пехотный полк
Путивльский конный полк
Сотня Меркулова
The full number of people was 1,200. But the most interesting thing is that the brigade of Ataman Iskry was not subject to Petlura, but to Gen. Stanisław Bułak – Balachowicz.
On 6 November 1920, the Bułak – Balachovich troops set off to attack. Along the left bank of the Pripeci, the 2nd (Minska) Infantry Division, but without the Vitebsky Infantry Regiment, but with the Ułański Regiment (detached from the Cavalry Division) – a full of 3,000 bayonets, 150 sabres and 8 guns. The 1st Infantry Division and Cavalry Division (without the Ulan Regiment) and the Vitebski Infantry Regiment (from the 2nd Infantry Division) followed by the 3rd Infantry Division—a full of 6400 bayonets, 800 sabres and 6th division.
At the same time, the Ataman Iskra brigade developed an attack on Owrucz, closely interacting with the Bolshevik forces operating in the rear, ataman Mordalevicz and Struk, as well as with others (with Bułak – Balachowicz was connected, among others, to operate in the north-western part of Czernichowszczyzna ataman Gałak).
In the meantime, let's go back to what was happening on Podol, where the Ataman Petlura troops were operating... This is due to the fact that the Bolsheviks, having learned the plans of the Ukrainian command, carried out a preemptive strike on 10 November, thus disorganizing the exit of Ukrainian-Russian troops on the base of the first attack (this action was mainly attended by the 8th cavalry division in force to 3 1000 riders – from the corps of the Red Primakov Cossack). Having broken the front in the vicinity of Mohylów Podolski, the russian cavalry moved north – to the rear of Ukrainian troops, threatening Petlura's command post.
Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks were in the rear of the Ukrainian troops, Petlura issued an order to execute the strike on 11 November. The attack began on November 14. All forces were grouped into 3 strike groups, the first was to hit Lityń – Winnica, the second on Bracław, and the 3rd on Tiraspol – the Baltic.
I will besides draw attention to the partisan (Attaman) “Naddniestrański Division” of the Ataman Zabolotny, besides called the “Chanomorska Group”, operating on the back of the Bolshevik troops in the area of the Baltic Sea, which was subject to respective Ataman troops, whose full number amounted to 4 1000 people (“the core” of the division was a branch under direct command of the Ataman Zabolotny in the strength of a 1000 bayonets and sabers).
In September 1920, General Hulyj – Hulenko, who commanded Petlura the insurgents of the south of Ukraine, attempted to submit to Zabolotny, but he refused to submit full to the main Ataman. Nevertheless, Hulyj – Hulenko included him in plans for the prepared attack of the URL army towards Tiraspol and the Baltic. In the end, Zabolotny did not lead his troops to Tiraspol, as he was expected by the staff of the Petluvian troops, which was 1 of the causes of the collapse of the full operation. To this day, it is not known what has stopped the Painful (or nonsubjective factors, or possibly he just didn't want to).
The main direction of impact was led by the troops of Piermykin and Yakovlev and the Zahorodz division. They managed to push distant the Bolshevik divisions standing in their way (24th firearm Division and 60th firearm Division), and then occupy the city of Lityń and thus approach the 20 km distance from Vinnica, to which the Donsk Cossacks Regiment from the Yakovlev Division moved. But that was the end of success. The Yakovlev division regiment was abolished by the attack of the russian 7th cavalry division, which then invaded the columns behind it, and then headed for Lityń – Płoskirów.
In this situation, Petlura issued an order to carry out a counterattack on the Bar, but in the gathering battle, the Petlura troops mixed with the Bolshevik troops, losing communication with each other. Petlura so issued an order to retreat to the defensive perimeter, covering the Ploskirs and the Podolski Stone. But on November 18, Kotowski cavalry brigade entered Ploskirov.
Petlura and his ministers went to Wołoczyńska, where at the gathering of the Council of Ministers the URL submitted a proposal for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Podola. On 20 November inactive fighting on Podol, the Petlur troops were ordered to retreat behind Zbrucz, which they did the next day. On November 21, at 7.00 p.m., the last Petlur troops were behind Zbrucz.
Having dealt first with the Wrangla troops, then Petlura, and earlier with insurgent troops from the Cherkas, Chehryn and Chołodny Jaru area, the Bolsheviks could now proceed to a proceeding with the machnovists, to whom it came to pay a immense price for their fresh short-lived flirting with the Red Army...
Wojciech Kempa