The network’s audit leads to a single technological leap: the edge of the customer’s customer’s network is located outside the country’s direct control. Purely technologically, the full content of Polish facts available for the American and French investigation. But what could possibly be for Israel!
Implementing summary
This method audit verifies the safety architecture of the Polish strategy KSeF (National e-Faktur System) in the field of network routing, encryption termination and data end-to-end encryption. All tests shall be repeated and may be verified by any individual with basic method knowledge.
Main findings:
- Traffic to KSeF passes through abroad infrastructure Imperva (Thales Group).
- TLS connections are decoded by Imperva before being transferred to MF servers.
- No end-to-end encryption at application level – invoices sent as open XML.
- Imperva has the method ability to view the content of all invoices issued in Poland.
Main audit thesis
1. Movement to KSeF passes through Imperva (Thales Group, USA/FR).
- Proof: DNS CNAME, IP, X-CDN header
2. Imperva specifies TLS and decrypts movement.
- Proof: Difference test with Host header: (Test 2.1)
3. No encrypting end-to-end payload invoices.
- Proof: XML analysis – no EncryptedData elements
4. Imperva has the method ability to read all invoices.
- Consequence: TLS + no E2E
5. Architecture does not meet the standards of digital sovereignty.
- Assessment: Critical fiscal strategy dependent on abroad infrastructure
Verification
Anyone can repeat these tests. Required tools (free):
- PowerShell (Windows)
- curl (Windows/Linux/Mac)
- ns lookup or Resolve-DnsName
All commands given in the audit are repetitive and verifiable. Here's the full audit: ]]>https://information-local.pl/audit-technical-ksef-report-full-2026-02-06/]]>
Imperva
I wrote 6 parts about the Polish KSeF, showing that this is simply a very large scandal to overthrow the Tusk government:
- ]]>Part I. KSeF does not extend surveillance. KSeF increases resolution.]]>
- Part II. KSeF practice: HurtPol versus Kowalski and Sons.
- Part III. admin of KSeF. Which is where the power truly lies.
- Part IV. KSeF technology – sovereignty ends where the cable ends!
- Part V. KSeF and continuity of the decision. Imperva, or sovereignty sold for installments!
- ]]>Part VI. KSeF - method explanation and applicable examples]]>
Imperva has full insight into the Polish economy, sees all Polish invoices through the KSeF system. But what kind of company is this?
Shlomo Kramer is simply a co-founder of the Imperva company in 2002 along with Mickey Boodaei and Amichai Shulman. Prior to the establishment of the company, he held military service in the Israeli defence forces of the IDF, specifically in the elite intelligence unit Unit 8200. It was there that he developed his cybersecurity skills before he founded the first Check Point Software company in 1993.
Imperva was sold to the French technology company Thales. The transaction took place in 2 stages: in 2018, American private equity firm Thoma Bravo purchased Imperva for $2.1 billion, and then in 2023 Thales acquired it from Thom Bravo for about $3.6 billion. Thales finalized the takeover in December 2023, earlier than originally planned.
After Thales took over, Imperva inactive maintains crucial R & D centres. The R&D Centre in Israel employs about 500 employees and was planned to further make it after the acquisition ended. Additionally, in India, Impervy's operations brought any 100 employees to Thales specialising in software development. Thales declared investment of EUR 4 billion a year in investigation and development, committed to supporting Imperva's customers and developing its solutions through accelerated innovation.
Grzegorz GPS Swiderski
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