“Army in ruin”: Picnics, harvests and cherry collection courses [talk]

krytykapolityczna.pl 10 months ago

Michał Sutowski: For 8 years Poles and Poles... as well as Polish troops were ruled by ministers from the Law and Justice Department – 2 in particular, Materevicha and Shiny. It's about their times—and what's left of them today—is Army in ruin. What distinguishes these 2 politicians in politics towards the army and the ministry?

Edyta Gory: One of my interlocutors called the times of Antoni Macierewicz in the MON “times of madness”. The minister was able to approach the officer and congratulate him on his large work, compliment him – after which he forgot about it, returned to his office, thought of something else and the same officer whom he praised half an hr earlier... He was fired.

Madness sometimes has a method.

I have the impression that no 1 could read it exactly, in the military it was a period of excitation. No 1 was certain what would happen next – whether Antoni would go to the Russians, due to the fact that he would have a whim, or he would not bomb the Palace of Culture and discipline in Warsaw. In his case, the environment he surrounded in the ministry was crucial. His counterintelligence boss was Piotr Bączek – a man who thought he had something to do with the services, but he did not know anything about them at all, and he was so a performer of the chief's whims. In the close vicinity there was besides Bartłomiej Grabski, notabene in the spring of this year released disciplinaryly from service at SKW. He enjoyed the large trust of Minister Macierewicz, while at the same time no 1 in the ministry or in the military knew what he was doing, but that he occupied MON's typical office and realised his sailing passions there. There was besides Misiewicz...

But it's more like a caricature figure?

Yes, his jumps were legendary, but the fact is that he could enter Minister Macierewicz always and, even more importantly, both the military and officials knew that in order to arrange a gathering with the Minister, he was going to Misiewicz. For example, he arranged an audience or signed documents.

What was the key to choosing this team?

Personal trust, mostly towards people who were previously unrelated to the military. Although it happened that he was in this environment, behind the words of Prime Minister Beata Szydło, Michał Dworczyk, who was completely an alien body there. So he was kept at all turn, humiliated and ridiculed by the alleged large boys Macerewicz, with Grabski, as well as Szatkowski and Kownack at the head. At the same time Dworzyk was at heart, he understood rather well and diagnosed his problems, he had any ways to solve them – but he was from Morawiecki camp, so he was excluded and he did not have easily. respective more military men were added to this manor, including the current Chief of General Staff Wiesław Kukuła, to whom Macierewicz entrusted the creation of the Territorial Defence Army.

WOT was an thought brought to Macerewicz or his own?

It was an thought that was born in the National Centre for strategical Studies, that is, a foundation bringing together Macerewicz's people after losing the 2007 election – first with Szatkowski and then Jack Kotas at the head. There were besides respective erstwhile military, including Colonel Kwasniak, a doctor of military sciences who was preparing a task to make a WOT.

Next to NCSS, General Kukuła played a large function – before Macerewicz appointed him head of the WOT, he commanded commandos in Ljubljana, to which he frequently invited politicians. There were people there from right to left, due to the fact that the general knew that political contacts would be very useful for his promotion. The key one, however, was Macierewicz – Kukuła reached him through the circles of Warsaw insurgents, whom the Lubiniecka unit helped – and somewhat forgotten Marek Opioła, MP of the Law and Justice for 5 consecutive word since 2005. Apart from them, various pro-defense environments, reconstruction groups were besides invited. any of them have a beautiful weird connection, by the way.

Reading the chapters of the book about Macerewicz, I felt that his obsession with human rights exchange was ideological: he was tracking the imagined remnants of communism in the army, and as a criterion he took the officer's attitude to the Smolensk catastrophe and the tradition of "soldiers cursed"...

That's right, although looking on a larger scale, the most crucial was the year of birth. As Antoni Macierewicz came to the MON, a squad was formed there to verify the personnel files of officers. The lower and mediate grades, as my interviewors say, were viewed by any students of KUL and UKSW, colleagues of Misiewicz, although this is classified information. Macierewicz himself personally reviewed the generals. They pointed out erstwhile the officer finished school, where he served, what kind of household relationships he had. It was said in the military that if you had a six in front, you'd actually be out 90 percent, only 7 in front of the birth date gave you a good chance to stay.

Because they were meant to be people of "uncontaminated PRL", without Russian military academy?

Yeah, but it was besides about being able to form them according to their own ideas. To make it molding material. Let us besides remember that promotions and career opportunities are the reverse of dismissal. As Macierewicz created the WOT, his commanders introduced in their units a kind of worship of the minister – they accepted and instilled the subordinate thought that this was our creator, our statesman, in fact the second Piłsudski. This has gone far adequate that erstwhile Mariusz Błaszczak became Minister of Defence, he is 1 of the commanders of the WOT brigade for a unit vacation and invited... Macierewicz, not the acting Minister of Defense.

I realize that Macerewicz wanted to exchange staff and form the army as he imagined it. What did the Blissman care about?

To make the military an efficient device to build the image and influence of the party. As a rule, the military is tasked with training during peace in order to be ready to defend borders in the event of a war, to be apolitical and not engage in extra-military activities, unless the officer is given approval to do so. And of course the army is to be controlled by civilian authority. The army must not break off the chain, but it must not be humiliated either, due to the fact that in effect it will become fearful and undecisionable. And here I return to Błaszczak: he treated the military like a propaganda machine, a set plan that could be shown to voters.

For example, at a picnic in the city, where an crucial MP or a candidate for mayor is moving in the election?

The picnics, the parades, the harvests, the fairs. He was curious in whether it would look good in the photograph with the equipment in the background, or if relations with NATO-wst maneuvers would go on on Twitter via Mariusz Błaszczak. However, he was not curious in the real force of the army and the state of preparation for tasks. There was a situation where the agenda of political picnics led to the rearrangement of the training agenda – dense equipment, including tanks or Rosomaki, was taken from units and camps, together with soldiers to show them in a designated place as decoration.

Your interlocutors say that Błaszczak was hated for these picnics and camera setups. But already Macierewicz is in the ranks of the troops well remembered due to the fact that he gave raises. possibly that's the actual credit. If we're gonna have a professional army, can't she be paid for in a grandfatherly way?

Macierewicz must be given that he felt the moods of the troops, especially the pits: the corps of Privates and Petty Officers. Until present I hear with them that Antoni was our minister, he understood us, he knew what hurt us. Macierewicz did 2 things by which the army remembered him so: felt increases, respective 100 zlotys in 2 years, but besides abolished the limit of 12 years of service, after which the Private, who did not receive the rank of the Petty Officer – at least the Corporal – was released from the service without the right to military retirement.

And that wasn't an thought to motivate soldiers to rise their qualifications? So the military doesn't service the professional seniors in their 50s?

Sure, a young army is simply a comedy, an old army is simply a tragedy. But the Government of the Civic Platform, which imposed this limit of 12 years, did not consider something. In order to become a corporal, it was essential to finish the commanding officer's school, and to do so, the commander had to direct the soldier to a suitable course. Not only did you gotta know the language and have a appropriate education, an internship – but you besides had to get this referral. People tried, they learned, but these were times erstwhile the army was already small, unemployment was rather large. Therefore, if individual did not have "backs" in the military, he did not have a chance at a junior advanced school. As a result, after 12 years, the army spit out specified people without anything like garbage. It robbed people of dignity, of honor. due to the fact that most of these people truly wanted to be soldiers and not for money at all, due to the fact that wages in the military were long frozen.

But possibly there was a way to get the promotion channels out.

In theory, yes, the problem was that it was a time to liquidate military units and reduce individual states, due to the fact that the time of essential military service was reduced, until yet Minister Klich completely liquidated the conscription in 2009. So there were fewer etats, caprals for training did not request so many. For this, there was an injustice connected with this,
that if you had an uncle, a brother-in-law or another friend of your father-in-law in the post of officer, you had a better chance than if without any connections you were in an army from a tiny town in the east of Poland. Antoni Macierewicz took it, so these privates carried it on their hands.

And where did these infamous courses come from – the mean ones say that weekends – general, non-stationary, with accelerated teaching and lowering requirements?

It's beautiful simple. Privates and enlisted officers of the head of the MON were easy to buy increases and to lift the limit of a 12-year contract. On the another hand, erstwhile it came to the officers' staff, Macierewicz removed a full generation of experienced officers at the age of about 50 or even younger, if they someway fell. There were people in this group with experience with missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The consequence was a generation gap – and play it. I think he was very conscious about the cleaning, due to the fact that abruptly all officer, captain or major saw what was going on upstairs. This general flies, that colonel flies, that lieutenant colonel is gone...

And individual should be in charge.

So the elevator goes up, there's a place in it, everybody wears a bagel in their backpack. And by whom? Of course, Anthony. He came to the MON with a certain plan and began implementation with the liquidation of the National Defence Academy in Rembertów, where the courses of strategical officers, including general, were organized. The minister did not want to conflict to throw out the rector, then 1 by 1 vice presidents, so he liquidated the full college and created a fresh one. And to direct her, he appointed the guy he caught in the corridor – Lieutenant Colonel Ryszard Parafianovich, so it happened that the author of the PhD entitled "The Doctorate". The independency Underground in Suwałszczyz 1944–1952. And that, promoted after successive cherry harvesting courses, opened up the minister's ability to produce his own generals and his own colonels. It was expected to be his army.

I realize that the long-term effect is that in the army many commanders are worse prepared than they should, due to the fact that they advanced faster than due to a average improvement path, to which I have been faithful to the minister for a long time. What are the side effects of picnic policy?

The "Materewicz Army" was alternatively a drill of the army, the changes active the officer corps – any were flown out or moved to absurd places, e.g. armadillos to the sea, so they left themselves; others were grateful to Macerewicz and are inactive here today. It looked different for Bliss. erstwhile he included the ministry as a minister in Morawiecki's government, in January 2018, people initially breathed. But it turned out very rapidly that there was execution at all levels. Macierewicz threw out officers at his discretion, but you can't say he didn't perceive to the army – he just surrounded himself with faithful ones. Błaszczak did not perceive to anyone – he could approach the Private, ask him how he was doing and eat peas together.

Not necessarily with the general?

He wouldn't let elder officers in, didn't talk to them, didn't ask their opinion. Plus, he was stiff and artificial, so he was given the name Ken. He gave orders by his people, especially the head of the MON Operations Centre, Agnieszka Glapiak. The military in his day was cut off by language, the staff felt incapacitated, like children who are given orders to be humiliated, and they have no influence on it. And we're not just talking about treating people. Błaszczak personally decided everything. He barely consulted the commanders.

Type: equipment purchases?

Yeah. He personally decided to acquisition equipment – e.g. 2 fresh types of tanks from 2 different countries, i.e. from the USA and South Korea or respective twelve costly assault helicopters. But it was besides about dislocating individuals or creating fresh structures like a division. Before the elections, she established 2 specified relationships that were formed, but only on paper. Blaszczak insisted that our army would number 300,000 soldiers. The number of armies is of course important. However, its quality is besides important. Meanwhile, as part of the voluntary essential military service, everyone was admitted, as it goes, without verification. There were many, many, due to the fact that present in the military, a mediate school man can make as much money as the chief of a tiny simple school. At the time, only the statistic mattered. The military and here had no right to vote.

The chief of staff was then General Rajmund Andrzejczak, who should be at all briefings due to his function. It should affect all specified decisions.

Didn't he?

It occurred that erstwhile the briefing was planned in the ministry, individual from the vicinity of Błaszczak called Andrzejczak and gave him an hour. As a result, the chief of staff was late due to the fact that this hr was... not real. So he waited until the briefing was completed, and after that individual from the MON was communicating to him what was on it. It was a deliberate humiliation of officers. Macierewicz wanted his faithful officer corps to love him – and Błaszczak wanted a propaganda device to fulfill organization goals that had nothing to say.

Among another things, your book shows that president Duda had a different imagination of the army than both ministers, much closer to real defence needs. Why did he not usage the tools he possessed – even the general nominations or the right to appoint a chief of general staff to temper or straight neutralize the ministers who harmed the military?

That saying that the president has quite a few possible to influence the military is simply a small overgrown. Yes, he is the head of the armed forces under the Constitution, but many things must be consulted by the Minister of Defence or the Prime Minister. The strategy papers are negotiated, worked out jointly. In the case of Antoni Macierewicz, private aversion surely worked – the head of the MON did not respect the young politician, president Duda at the time. He felt that MON was his principality and that no 1 would interfere. Even the president. At the same time, this exclusion of the head of the armed forces from deciding on the military was not entirely successful.

But isn't it that Macerewicz's departure from the MON simply decided to force Americans about the excesses of his people in the Polish Armed Group? And that the president didn't have much to say here?

I won't let Americans to be the key here. At the resignation of Macerewicz – let us remind that Prime Minister Beata Szydło left with the resignation – there were respective factors. The opinion of allies, of course, may have mattered due to the fact that he was completely uninterested in what was happening abroad. He was not at NATO meetings, he sent Kownacki and Szatkowski – the second was rather an efficient diplomat, but already Kownacki is an accidental person, and both of them had no support from the country, so they could not do much.

How did they not have support?

After all, the office of Macerewicz with Misiewicz in MON began with an invasion of the NATO Expert Center, which was simply broken into, which made a terrible impression. Then, in July 2016, there was the NATO summit in Warsaw, where the Pact drill came, and Macerewicz made it clear that he did not trust them. It was very strange, due to the fact that that summit was to bring, among others, the installation of the NATO intelligence agency in Poland. The talks on this subject with the Americans and the remainder of NATO were rather advanced, but the allies were so disgusted by what happened in Warsaw that they simply deviated from the plan. It is good that although General Mieczysław Gocuł – then the Chief of the General Staff – managed to save the "permanent, rotating presence" of American troops in the country. Although this task was on the line. It was through the actions of Macerewicz.

But he remained in the position for another year and a half.

Yes, due to the fact that problems with him have been established – misiewicz's caricatural behavior, problems in the PGZ, another confrontation with the president. In time Kaczyński began to realize that the war between Macerewicz and the Presidential Palace could end badly for him and that Duda would yet halt signing the laws.

Was the formation of the Territorial defence Army a good idea? Adversaries, including generals, say it's any weekend military. Or simply that it is the defender of the praetorian Antoni Macierewicz.

When all this began, I heard this criticism, especially from erstwhile generals, whom Antoni Macierewicz threw out of the army. And then I thought that wasn't the way. That's a large idea. due to the fact that there are situations specified as floods, for example, erstwhile we have soldiers kept from the state budget, who even want to aid people who lose their possessions or their lives – but they cannot, due to the fact that procedures do not let them. A friend of mine told me how they utilized military equipment to supply people with water and food to avoid regulations. In order to help, they had to follow the law. The WOT uprising redefines the function of the army. It gives these soldiers the freedom to act within the country during crises.

So it's worth creating?

I thought it was cool that we'd have an army that would be meant for this, a auxiliary army, closer to the people. due to the fact that war can happen, but it doesn't have to, but various crises, natural disasters, etc., will happen.

Except it's all a civilian defence job.

And that we don't have it is simply a scandal. But I will repeat: for Minister Klich, the draft was liquidated. The military so has a problem with the deficiency of trained reserves. Since young people are not going to service as a conscript, the supply of reserves has actually run out. Thus, WOT could give 2 in one: trained men, able to usage weapons, knowing what the military is. And at the same time, people who aid fellow citizens in crises. And yet a young, darted officer – commander of a commando unit will be at the head. It looked good.

I understand, I'm the only 1 who reads in the book that the WOTs are very poorly trained, although they get very good equipment. In addition, their backing takes place at the expense of operational troops. besides at the expense of equipment and personnel escape – due to the fact that if you can get better money and fast promotion in WOT, why sit in your old unit as a regular professional? In addition, it turned out that “territorial” troops are not associated with their local territory, which soldiers should know well and thus besides be useful to their own community.

Sure, I'm talking about my first impressions. Not just their own, due to the fact that the public saw them organize vaccination points on COVID or floods. There were besides average operating troops, but they were not noticed due to the fact that it was not on them that Macerewicz built himself an image. However, it shortly turned out precisely all this: that WOT was propagated into any kind of creation. Even the coined concepts – “territorials”, almost like “specials”, suggested that they would be almost commandos after selection, any superpartisan. Macierewicz said that after this 16-day training they would be able to fight a Russian specnaz... At the same time, recruitment was frequently accidental, and it was encouraged in all way, even by summoning priests from church ambon. The money for the fresh equipment was bypassing the operating troops and headed for WOT. They themselves thought they were as equipped as operating troops.

Were they better equipped? 1 of the speakers in Army in ruin He says: “The submission to the minister, not to the chief of staff, guaranteed the WOT brigade commanders specified a strong position that they became incredibly brazen. They thought they deserved everything. They wanted boats, they got them, they wanted quads, they got them, they wanted drones, they got them, they wanted the best sniper rifles in the world, they wanted fire boots, they bought them too." And besides Jelcze to transport, although it is on political order to aid any plant.

Of course. average soldiers from WOT realized that they had better equipment than the remainder of the soldiers erstwhile they met operational troops on the Belarusian border, where they were abruptly told to go. And they collided with the tin helmets of their colleagues, the old gun, and the armored armor.

And why did WOT keep their position even after Macerewicz left?

And this is simple – they were just good at propaganda. And if something works, it fits the narrative, then why change it? General Kukuła turned out to be just the officer the PiS needed. And he helped the organization grow in the military, even the cult of Macerewicz silenced a bit for the fresh head of the department. And he rapidly gained the favors of the government.

We are talking about a very advanced officer – today, general of the army, which is the highest of all, due to the fact that we have no marshal in Poland since Marian Spychalski died in 1980. erstwhile the gene. Andrzejczak spectacularly, due to the fact that just before the elections in October 2023, he resigned, Gen. Kukuła was promoted to the position of Chief of General Staff. And it remains it to this day. Reading the Last Chapters Army in ruin 1 can conclude that despite the change of government in the military, small has changed. but possibly bishops don't question officers, soldiers don't watch TVP Info.

The atmosphere is important, too. That people stopped being afraid of getting fired for any bullshit. On the corridors of the "Pekin", or powerful MON building in the Avenue of Independence, began to go out and talk, before there was an atmosphere of intimidation. You never knew if your friend was spying on you or ratting on you.

But this sounds like Russian stories just after the collapse of the USSR – that, yes, it is allowed to tell a gag about the president and will not arrest anyone for it. But what else?

The military is simply a machine, very dense and resistant erstwhile it comes to change. Unless you have determination and a plan like Antoni Macierewicz or, to any extent, Błaszczak. On the another hand, Kosiniak-Kamysz's squad entered the MON without a plan, due to the fact that he was sent there as a consequence of a negotiated coalition agreement. By the time he realized where the water was leaking, he had quite a few water in his mouth and was standing in the water. But he's starting to wave that bucket a small bit, spill any of what's left of the PiS.

What precisely does that mean?

For example, the resignations of the most compromised officers, late 4 generals, including those mentioned in our conversation with the parishioner. We besides have the first general nominations of the fresh team, which have been received rather well.

It's personal, but what about the purchasing policy?

In purchasing policy, the situation is dramatic, and unfortunately it will reflect hiccups not even for us, but for future generations.

So what the PiS ordered is another government buying?

Yeah. Deputy Minister Paweł Bejda, who has immense influence in the resort, has late photographed himself against the background of Apache AH-64E helicopters, which we ordered 96, for 10-12 billion dollars with the operation. And these are, let's add, assault helicopters whose American programs have ended due to the fact that the war in Ukraine has shown that this equipment is besides costly and inefficient. It's just that the battlefield is occupied by drones that are cheaper and much more efficient, and at the same time, people are not killed, at least ours. Additionally, the minister enjoys an offset, which concerns little than 3 percent of the contract – I would add that erstwhile buying F-16 we had this offset 100 percent.

And you can't get out of it?

Korean and American purchases are carried out. I am afraid that, due to possible contractual penalties for breach of contract and political global costs, this is simply a immense mine planted by the fresh ruling by the PIS.

Should the military "defence the Polish-Belarusian border" against refugees? It seems that so much has not changed since the regulation of the Law and Justice. There are no more press conferences on alleged zoophilia, but pushbacks continue.

And they will. Poor, hungry people who present push our border have become a weapon in the hands of Putin and Lukashenko regimes. Climate change, conflicts, poverty, deficiency of water, it's all gonna grow. However, in this mass of injured people at the border there are already militias trained in military centers in the east. We must be aware that erstwhile we let them into the European Union, we are cutting up the branch we are sitting on. possibly it's time, even though I know it's hard to realize that not everyone can be saved.

I erstwhile asked a fellow officer if there was any remorse in seeing these people trying to get on our side. He replied: “I am a soldier. I got a occupation to defender the border. That is the function of the army and that is our task.”

And can the WOT turn into something more like the civilian defence that everyone dreamed of, rooted locally and helping in crises?

WOT had its swans singing a fewer months ago, for it was announced that the Territorial defence Army had been certified, which was to check the combat readiness of these troops. However, it turned out that it worked like it did before, behind the Cukula: the NATO-based certification was loudly announced, after which, as Onetu journalists, we proved that it was not true. There was no certification, at most no command-and-sht training on computers, not checking the readiness of individual brigades and the WOT command.

General Kukuła is no longer in charge of WOT, but the full army. Can things change here?

But the change takes place – the Territorial Defence Army has just passed from subjugation straight to the Minister of National Defence to the Head of the General Staff. So they go back to the matrix. Unfortunately, I can't explain why the Navy, the Air Force, the Land Army and peculiar Forces are under the command of the General Types of Armed Forces, and WOT is to pass straight under the SG. I think it's a beautiful thoughtless decision by the Department of Defense.

What should MON change urgently in the military, and what does it not do?

Improve military education, heal the training system, reconstruct the soldiers' dignity. But above all, politicians should never replace officers as commanders again. I think these are the most crucial issues.

Edyta Zimła – Onetu journalist, recognized military-related specialist. Co-author of the popular War Front podcast. Book author Army in ruin (Red and Black, 2024), Bestselling Newsbook Betrayed Revealing the scenes louder the Nangar Khel case and the river interview with Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak We're on the brink of war.. erstwhile editor-in-chief and creator of the Polish-Army portal.pl. He cooperates with the Reporters' Foundation, focusing Polish investigative journalists. She was a war correspondent in Afghanistan.