Agentry in poland controlled by russia

AGENTURE IN POLAND BY RUSSIA

The military information services liquidated in 2006 were controlled by Russia.

When russian troops were withdrawn from Poland in the early 1990s, the euphoria was so large that no 1 considered the consequences of the half-century russian presence in our territory. The problem was not peculiarly noticed by the Military Information Services created in 1991. Their management never considered this problem a priority, and for 15 years the WSI had not located any Russian spy.

The problem of russian heritage was besides not seen by national defence ministers overseeing WSI activities.

The rulers of the USSR were aware that erstwhile withdrawing their troops from the countries of Central and east Europe, they could not lose russian influence.

Therefore, the Russians decided to usage the last years of their stay in Poland to build an operational infrastructure that could be useful in the future. Working on russian military units, GRU and KGB cells were intensively acquiring agents and operationally collecting information about Polish citizens.

Operational work was carried out not only among officers in close units of the Polish Army, but besides among people surviving around these units. It was besides not avoided to establish “links of friendship” with representatives of the Polish administration, which was facilitated by the authoritative talks of Russian military forces with local authorities. The main aim was to make an operational base, or alleged frozen agentry, which could be launched erstwhile the units of the russian Army would no longer be stationed in the territory of Poland.

As early as 1994 – 1996, Russian GRUs and KGB began to activate “freezing” operational contacts. In the 1990s, the Polish officers organized the most frequent meetings with the russian Army officers they had previously met, and now incoming to Poland. However, our services did not show much interest in the “tourist” trips of officers to our country. Illegal trade was an excellent cover for the visits of the “Soviet colleagues”.

Russian spy activity was frequently masked by commercial companies involving Russian capital which arose in the early 1990s. Among them were Russian soldiers. These companies, at least respective hundred, operated primarily in western Poland, where Russian garrisons had previously been stationed. They frequently easy entered military activities. They offered their aid to Polish companies dealing with alleged peculiar turnover. It was not by accident that many Polish tycoons in this manufacture benefited from the aid of Russian companies.

Soviet operating infrastructure in Poland may have been supplemented by a group of LWP officers who had undergone training in the times of the Polish People's Republic, or received a command education in the erstwhile USSR. For many months, our officers' visits to Russian-controlled centres were conducive to gaining “hooks” on them, which in turn facilitated recruitment. However, the Russians did not immediately usage the “help” of Poles. Recruited officers left in “freezing” for many years. They were guided by the reasonable presumption that graduates of these courses could be subject to control of Polish services. The process of activating them, the Russian superiors started only during the removal of russian troops from Poland. It was then that the KGB and GRU staff began to intensively refresh their relationship with the recently established WSI staff.

By 1998, the WSI had not taken any steps to measure and verify people who had received training in the USSR in the past. Mainly due to the fact that most of the WSI executives have received specified training. inactive in 1998, 158 officers served in the WSI after russian courses, and this was a customized in executive positions.

They were the ones who shaped the WSI and decided on the career of another officers. erstwhile Poland participated in the “Partnership for Peace” in 1994, authoritative contacts between WSI officers and NATO service representatives were increasingly taking place. The past of Polish officers trained in the East, however, has long been known to Western services, which aroused the reluctance of Western allies. They besides had no assurance in Poles.

For example, the events of the 1990s erstwhile Germany, among others, did not consent to Colonel Cezary Lipert, a postgraduate of the GRU course in Cologne. On the another hand, the Canadian side reluctantly referred to the candidate Colonel Dobrosław Mąka, a two-way GRU course participant. It was not until 1998 that the WSI (gen. Tadeusz Rusak) management began to identify threats to the WSI from russian academy graduates and peculiar courses. Then about 50 military officers, fearing questions about education in the USSR, resigned and went to rest. erstwhile the SLD won the election in 2001, the Star action was abandoned.

The WSI continued to service 66 officers after russian training (in exposed positions) and inactive did not constitute an obstacle to their careers. An example may be the erstwhile head of WSI General Bolesław Izydorczyk. WSI had information demonstrating his contacts with Russian peculiar Services officers. Gen. Izidorczyk, thanks to the support of people from the surroundings of president Kwasniewski and the passiveness of the then head of WSI Gen. Tadeusz Rusak, received, despite serious doubts, adequate safety clearance and went to Brussels, where he had access to NATO's top secrets.

Leaving Poland in 1993, the Soviets left the operational infrastructure based on 2 valuable news channels.

The first, connected with the activity of KGB and GRU during the last period of the russian Army's stay in our country, was to build an information network aimed at the functioning of the Polish army.

The second was much more dangerous due to the fact that hidden inside it – it was based on graduates of russian universities and peculiar courses.

These 2 channels gave Russians a immense advantage in relations with Polish services. They enabled russian services to identify and neutralize WSI's operational activities. Even worse was that they could usage “Polish colleagues” to admit NATO command systems (Poland entered them officially in 2004).

For a reason, the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Gen. Paweł Graczev said:

"In Poland we have only friends, and among them are trusted people". In this context, the resolution of the WSI was the late start of the construction of sovereign national security.

Developd by Aleksander Szumański “The Voice of Poland” Toronto

Alexander Szumański

https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009664654533

== sync, corrected by elderman ==

http://aleszum.btx.pl/index.php/publications

https://www.facebook.com/Aleshum/?fref=ts

http://aleksanderszumanski.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=1&Itemid=2

Documents, sources, quotations:

– Leszek Pietrzak “Forbidden History” “Russian “ Village” 2011