The president of the United States has announced his resignation from moving for re-election. After a failed debate and many accidents, the likelihood of specified a movement increased dramatically, the more there were more and more signals of the Democratic Party's elite turning against its candidacy. In this text we will look at Joe Biden's legacy of abroad policy.
Joe Biden started his presidency with a password America is back, although a simple return to carefree post-cold-war hegemonism was no longer possible due to a change in the global strategy of forces. The withdrawal from Afghanistan in the first year of the presidency announced a retreat from the farthest ideological ambitions of liberal interventionism, "the end of the era of large military operations for the conversion of another states", as Biden himself said in August 2021.
But besides this “goose” lifted the wind of post-cold triumphalism – Biden powerfully supported the 1995 attacks on the Serbs in Bosnia and the 1999 attack on Yugoslavia, which is in practice the separation of Kosovo. This was the first case of armed forced border change in Europe, given that most of the European Union and NATO countries, including the US, recognized the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo almost immediately after the unilateral declaration of independency by its authorities. Already then a fresh circular of territorial revisions on the continent was opened, which in February 2022 "blowed us to the face" of the war in Ukraine.
Biden not only supported the attack on Afghanistan, but most likely the biggest mistake of the American abroad policy of the post-cold war era – the demolition of the Iraqi state in 2003 and the liberal effort nation building in this country, which has opened the door to Iran. Biden had already sought a way out of Iraq in 2006, but with colonial manners – through the concept of converting the country into a federation of ethno-religious regions, which brought to head the Sykes-Picot agreement, which was... the origin of the problems of the modern mediate East. Later, Biden argued against expanding the contingent of American forces in Iraq from 2009 to 2011. He was right. At the end of that period, Barack Obama announced the end of an armed operation in Iraq (in practice any US troops stay to this day), not achieving any clear political goal. Biden was besides to rise concerns about the 2011 attack on Libya.
From this very brief description of his biography at the level of global policy emerges a figure of flexible policy, whose flexibility is shifted to instability.
The presidency was just spent on zigzag between the option of defending global hegemony, inactive supporting a large condition of the American elite, and the precedence of engagement (mainly at the expense of the mediate East) against expanding deficiency of strength and resources.
Middle East
Although the United States maintained a sanctioning government against Syria, it did not launch another circular of mass support for the armed anti-government groups Obama provided. Biden was besides 1 of the more critical of Israel's U.S. presidents. He suspended the run of formal designation and support for the annexationist and colonial policy of Israel led by Donald Trump. However, it was adequate to attack Hamas on Israel to liberate old reflexes. The U.S. became active in the massive material and operational support of Tel Aviv, taking into account the goals and manner of conducting the war by Benjamin Netanyahu. This brought the administration costs in interior policy (against certain social groups and this from the back of his camp) and external – Trump's success in normalising relations between the U.S. and Israel's arabian allies was relativized. The former, with Saudi Arabia in the lead, clearly moved closer to the Chinese and even Russian positions (operation under OPEC Plus, position towards the war in Ukraine). Chinese effectively mediating the normalization of relations between Saudis and Iran lead to a preliminary agreement between conflicted Palestinian groups – these events depict the erosion of Washington's influence in the region.
In the case of the mediate East conflict, Biden's policy was an effort to find indirect solutions – full support for Israel, simultaneous halting the supply of dense bombs erstwhile the Israelis manifestly ignored the Bidenian reservations about the attack on Rafah in the Gaza Strip only to unlock their deliveries after a fewer weeks, despite the fact that Netanyahu's attitude did not change anything.
Despite the manifestation of U.S. force. The Yemeni Navy Ansarullah launched a run to question the key foundation of American superpowerism – ruling on the planet ocean, attacking ships on 1 of the world's key maritime trade routes. Biden responded with the impact of drones and rockets, which did not affect Hutich's behaviour and potential, while liberated the recent, more powerful hit of Israel on Hudad. This conflict is widening against Washington's strategy.
War in Ukraine
In calculating Biden's shortcomings or failures, however, it must be stressed that it has collided with the top safety crisis in Europe for decades, the largest war on our continent after 1945. Biden had to decide whether the periphery of an ageing, increasingly little innovative, economically stagnant, comparatively disarmed continent without political leaders from a real event and with divided, imploding and demoralized in a serious part of societies are inactive a key theatre to affirm American credibility. Biden felt yes, and became active in Ukraine's support for serious.
Anyone who questions the scale of American engagement in war should look at the map and see how peripheral Ukraine is to the US, and at the same time regret that the existing material military support for Kiev is already greater than more than 2 decades of support to South Vietnam's armed forces...
This is not just about material support. Training, as well as operational support through the satellite and electronic surveillance system, possibly the assistance of military personnel on site, with the usage of key elements of precision weapons (as they revealed in their case the French) provided the Ukrainians with the essential grounds for conducting specified modern operations, which stopped the first Russian offensive actions from many directions and saved for Zelensk Kiev, or possibly himself. It is believed that without US support Ukraine would have fallen in 2022.
Biden's realistic goal towards Ukraine was to prevent this country or what would become of it from becoming an undisputed Russian sphere of influence, and to make it a carrot, the chaotic fields of the Americanum Empire, on which the imperial ambitions of the Kremlin are wiped and disciplined. His goal was not to start a war with Russia until the parade of triumph in Red Square. The course of war points to the worsening effects of this strategy, so I believe that even without change in the White home Washington would yet force Volodymyr Zelenski to any form of at least freezing the conflict, whose bills the Ukrainians will pay. It appears that Biden never gave up on the thought of specified a change in Russian policy that Moscow would become a predictable partner for its power behind the PRC in the long term. Moscow and Beijing's current level of cooperation is simply a nightmare of American politics.
In consequence to the Russian invasion, Biden has already achieved large success in consolidating Washington's global camp, an imperial US field. European but besides far east allies, in a reasonably disciplined way, entered into competition with Russia, supporting broad sanctions and supporting Ukraine more or less. 1 effect was the displacement of Russian energy natural materials from European markets, including US suppliers. Biden succeeded in inviting Australians, Japanese, Koreans and fresh Zealanders to the NATO summits, while taking steps towards a more multilateral architecture of American influences in East and South-East Asia. American politics have moved distant from the hub and spoke pattern for more multilateral formats, as I erstwhile wrote.
As part of this, Biden launched an ideological narrative, which he probably, as an American liberal, even partially believes. The communicative of the clash between the planet of democracy and the axis of autocracy. While it has any power in the ecumen of the West, on a global scale it is already treated as annoying hypocrisy or dangerous fanaticism, as seen in the attitude taken by the Global War against Russia and Ukraine. The South or the way Russia was able to enter the alternate economical cycle, marginalising the importance of the West in its economy. This year's threats by Saudis about the abandonment of western debt papers at G7, if the West decides to take over frozen Russian assets, show that Biden could not halt or even slow down changes in the structure of planet trade, safety and politics.
The West was alone with respective serious old allies co-opted earlier, with little and little influence on what American theorists call global governance.
With any success, although surely insufficient to bridge the effects of global balance of power, Biden besides forced European allies to increase safety and defence spending. So he followed in Trump’s footsteps, but he did so in a more conciliative way.
In a clash with China, after Trump lost the trade war on steel and this akin mass production, Biden has alternatively chosen the most crucial fields of action – innovative technologies. In the field of cutting off Chinese from American know-how and slowing down the improvement of Chinese semiconductor sector, he achieved noticeable successes. narration tactics derisking alternatively of decoupling, i.e. the gradual scrapping with China alternatively of fast building, ironically, of the Chinese wall, has besides led European allies to increasingly harsh rhetoric towards Beijing, as reflected in this year's European Union and NATO documents. The door to the latter's engagement in the Far East theatre was lifted. This Biden identified as a priority, restoring permanent military presence in Taiwan and prompting its authorities to increasingly harsh anti-Pekinese declarations after the election of fresh president Lai Ching-te.
Joe Biden's presidency resembled a voyage of a utilized ship, whose captain, increasingly tired, struggled with expanding divisions in the crew. He had to balance between Scylla and Charybda, conflicting vectors of interior and external politics of America. However, in this turbulent and ever-changing world, abroad policy is not a slow cruise but a race requiring fast response, decisive action and a clear imagination of the future. Therefore, the future president of the United States will not be only reactionary. It will face a challenge of changing global dynamics, which makes it very hard to keep American dominance in an increasingly multipolar world. After 4 years of Joe Biden's tenure, we see that he would not have given the ship a fresh direction to “take the wind off the sails.”
